RTF malware analysis — malicious · afc0b66dfb71b33d

MALICIOUS

RTF

75.9 KB First seen: 2024-08-19

MD5: 01ee2a10ee91efdcf290d48901cbc8d1 SHA-1: 2de45d650386fea4e9f4aef72c838506b9587b26 SHA-256: afc0b66dfb71b33dca6e88ae7000618324f24d1a4065b0498176ae52697e2ea9

160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

The RTF file contains an OLE object with a split Equation Editor ProgID, indicating exploitation of CVE-2017-11882. The presence of \objupdate suggests automatic activation of the embedded object. While no scripts were directly extracted, the exploitation method strongly implies the execution of a secondary payload, likely downloaded from a remote source.

Heuristics 4

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK

RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off000013b3.bin` `3c5cae07891b3564ccb5618cc3028681bc8f7d265d61561d7fe01c51bd7810a1`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x13B3	1554 bytes

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