Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 afbe60d018760077…

MALICIOUS

PDF

99.7 KB
MD5: 69d217823ec4ec63874cdfc66f9abaa1 SHA-1: 06fda1046efb816224eef7dd6185c7169e0ff6b1 SHA-256: afbe60d018760077f1b311e517b6f16fa8285e0cae89d21317bf91afb16ca904
136 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File: Exploitation for Client Execution

The sample is a PDF document that exploits the CVE-2010-0188 vulnerability in Adobe Reader. This vulnerability is related to the handling of XFA forms and embedded TIFF images. The critical heuristic firing indicates that the XFA payload was decoded from a raw stream, suggesting the execution of malicious code. No specific family could be identified, but the exploit mechanism is clear.

Heuristics 6

  • Adobe Reader LibTIFF XFA image exploit — CVE-2010-0188 critical CVE likely CVE_2010_0188
    PDF contains the CVE-2010-0188 exploit template: XFA JavaScript heap-spray setup, a generated TIFF image payload, and assignment of that TIFF data to an XFA image field rawValue to trigger Adobe Reader's LibTIFF parser.
  • XFA form contains executable script high CVE related PDF_XFA_SCRIPT
    PDF embeds an XFA form whose dataset contains a <script> or <xfa:script> block — XFA scripting has been the exploit primitive for several Adobe Reader RCEs (CVE-2010-0188 family, CVE-2018-4901, and others). Plain XFA without scripts is far less risky.
  • Embedded script payload in PDF stream medium PDF_EMBEDDED_SCRIPT_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an HTML/XFA <script> tag without accompanying Windows shell-execution primitives — common in accessible XFA forms but worth surfacing for analyst review.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • XFA form low PDF_XFA
    PDF uses XML Forms Architecture — can contain script logic
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://ns.adobe.com/xdp/
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-template/2.5/
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-data/1.0/

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_file_obj0008.bin
4eb3f60c85c2bedf107a6ce36cb97d9d6a0757babb3ac420d2a6d2a48a9a4c06
pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 8 at offset 0xC6 101354 bytes