Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 afad6e07b365bc5d…

MALICIOUS

PDF

71.6 KB Created: 2020-12-05 00:14:36 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-05-23
MD5: da791ed3782a71b661793f371540d9fb SHA-1: 3500184a3094cf2515291bdfbd5d260039042d92 SHA-256: afad6e07b365bc5df7b842c3c7721af3e5659eda0e95786a47cecf1f6451287a
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The PDF contains a large number of embedded links, many of which point to disposable domains or redirectors, indicating a link farm or SEO manipulation scheme. One critical heuristic identified a link to known malicious redirector infrastructure, suggesting a potential for malicious content delivery. No scripts were extracted, and the document body was heavily obfuscated, limiting further analysis of specific payloads.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9997

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ggtraff.ru/aws?utm_term=chrome+browser+extensions+android In PDF document text
    • https://gupovokezatiku.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/8/134878629/kaforikiselini.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mimitokiwunas.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/0/134012498/2836359.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xonuveviriniw.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130738603/nogibugexurobo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://fevijalefo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134383315/tesufitogofale.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kukevukoleguko.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/2/134265740/metuzel.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://dunopupusegujuz.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134348927/duputojobafutu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kapekutom.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134437999/zanolak_xejob_tudokaku.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/solonebosop/rifeto.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/e01cebae-5429-4b94-a427-e9c72c5dd3b4/frontline_iep_direct_nj.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/d1a26b9f-8ab5-497a-b396-4c535f3438ee/gtcc_jamestown_campus_address.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/gupuso/guzeferenoporilulejapaxox.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/9c63ca23-37da-4353-866e-8c76fdd319dd/52013499744.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/vekodupiwarobi/ragikudes.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000dba0.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xDBA0 5240 bytes
SHA-256: 40acb1f62fd26cc6c5eb6302bafd67e1efdef2a7873b248e90e93d0ca8ea8ca3
font_01_sfnt_off0000ed4b.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xED4B 10712 bytes
SHA-256: 8ef1c99b03f6ac5d228781e5116fa6a77b83e2a24a62d51ed7cecc8e24736f4d

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