Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 af8c79c947c1193e…

MALICIOUS

PDF

72.3 KB Created: 2021-02-18 19:53:38 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-09-25
MD5: 02243db054edb8d4d200abb0291b31d3 SHA-1: f0c9a49691f3681faac12c0d9e42a43ce9f3bd15 SHA-256: af8c79c947c1193e5a23694f090ec42bd1daf3e356155adfde9e3b8c8625700c
186 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

This PDF document was flagged as malicious by ClamAV and an ML classifier. The file embeds a large number of external links characteristic of an SEO link farm. Specific URLs and indicators for this sample are listed in the indicators section.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://jottigo.ru/wix?keyword=sunny+side+up+blog+mudroom PDF link annotation
    • https://tifogufa.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131637606/314aea67844.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://tonituligavu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/8/134884188/8475576.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kuvezuwuziteb.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134388010/gejaburiwi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://fetezubusob.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132681625/8937526.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/sinewuvemomi/ifcjhij/fish_live_wallpaper_hd.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/pibilebomek/hjjheCo/solution_survivor_zombie_outbreak_walkthrough.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://lovizedisar.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131437361/xusobajarezofen_defolaf_sator.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xavimunemu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/8/132815343/c16125855e.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jutifakakunule.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/9/135985430/8052965.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kojivijagidisu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/0/134042347/4219555.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/tajiwikiter/WPWsrFT/mimapodinujo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://dakawomafi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/9/135959339/xawobuxeg_samowebovoxafi_bosanubetupimo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/bozutebux/dfiaqhg/75310046294.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sapigufebo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134592603/gomelif.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/vofonowul/ZB0cjbZ/the_impossible_quiz_2_answers_25.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://fikuvigobe.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134582673/7120248.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wukelefitifaka.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/8/134882985/95673cf.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000d9c3.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xD9C3 5412 bytes
SHA-256: 0e9b85f7b5a20dbb0d8639cfff197ce7c9f454b7e3dfce5c749e79b53f3a9911
font_01_sfnt_off0000ec1b.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xEC1B 12468 bytes
SHA-256: a886b3eb24290084633f8ecdf320b6124b7e09810d2d659ab5b6581aaa056e34