Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 af6f64bdcb8dd561…

MALICIOUS

RTF

13.8 KB First seen: 2023-03-24
MD5: f3f27539efc7350df9dc444676687f9b SHA-1: 166f84a378a47f0d1d26dd1338404de9817c2e77 SHA-256: af6f64bdcb8dd561cda554933b57cf7d479c8079baf6a716be19ab03d359cbdb
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF file contains embedded OLE object data, specifically targeting the Equation Editor with a known exploit. The \objupdate directive indicates that the OLE object will be activated automatically upon opening the document. This exploit likely leads to the download and execution of a secondary payload, though the specific payload and its origin are not detailed in the provided evidence.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000010f2.bin
8afb463e29e275d3c874edf674b335aad846d732287d27353165b07cae7a30e1
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x10F2 1867 bytes