Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 af60316d331cabaf…

MALICIOUS

PDF

88.4 KB Created: 2021-07-26 12:32:05 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-10-12
MD5: 7af8e86099ae384f169c8b3dea766d6b SHA-1: 99bb4f4ca0077a8a3f2beb3ad05495d120b17730 SHA-256: af60316d331cabafa85758102b83d4f8faca6713644cddf67378e528457212ef
196 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

This PDF file was detected as malicious by ClamAV and an ML classifier, indicating a phishing and potential trojan threat. The document employs a social-engineering lure to trick users into installing browser updates or extensions, a common method for distributing malware or stealing credentials. While no scripts were directly extracted, the presence of numerous URLs, some hosted on compromised or disposable domains, suggests a phishing campaign or a downloader for further malicious content.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9993

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • Browser extension / update installation lure high SE_BROWSER_INSTALL_LURE
    Document tells the user to install a browser extension, plugin, viewer, or browser update to view content — a common social-engineering path for credential theft and malware installation
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://csc0898.com/userfiles/file/20210726020721_h679w9.pdf In PDF document text
    • https://afriqueitnews.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/17c30ac816cf988fb72d01ec94b6ec58/baloxupefobafowi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://emilymillerlaw.com/customer/3/d/9/3d947ad6ce2568d98b832ccf5548371bFile/60286014604.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://iwish-cosmetics.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160940d754233c---fajadavulegodugosu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://deauville.ru/files/file/79412143667.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://yuktiedu.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/22c96d6b73bab3943a475f8ef5c22c6b/58092404338.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://smarttactic.ro/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1608f2e360c2ac---82568233330.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://medicinasolidale.org/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/765146cfbe3bc65cbea326bef0592ec4/xapejojodi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sabunwangi.com/contents//files/19526428745.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://skvacations.com/userfiles/file/tavadivejawidizonebamirev.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.medipratik.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160864fb8a8b21---94114692462.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://global-brand.net/userfiles/files/waxiwu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://yangpupark.com/uploadfile/files/pojotugoledipuputusekam.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://trainternational.in/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16074538e81879---vixunawata.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://backupcenters.com/userfiles/file/7863732505.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://gtlmarinefuel.com/userfiles/file/62216892399.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.medical-psychology.gr/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160f15022d4807---39227569420.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://homeaestheticsllc.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/dd99f4a848e42329f5bde0651924755f/japusibegekive.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://cuhs1981.com/clients/8/82/82ca37c076ec4232796cb58ed009bb3a/File/babetomevamevivemodu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sygimportaciones.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/pk21scvvpfpd4iehuk302bo350/86275868978.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://choiceenergynetwork.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/5c848093c303d5b697a7bee4e3687add/14760569736.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://ac-kenigsberg.ru/files/file/dimak.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/skout/mBVl/~3/DOqCt-cVA4I/uplcv?utm_term=l%27oreal+paris+blonde+supreme+excellence+creme+instructionsPDF link annotation
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000ec3d.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xEC3D 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
font_01_sfnt_off00010454.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x10454 11008 bytes
SHA-256: e274f7c5b85c95fb0f0c154449a39e981f334f1bd13a561edf1ae44757bca0c2
font_02_sfnt_off00011da7.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x11DA7 20468 bytes
SHA-256: 21951f910d007fcc54ebdf785b924be767fcb870615f030c70aabbbe2ae355a1

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