Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 af5a01a9350ce5ee…

MALICIOUS

PDF

51.7 KB Created: 2020-10-07 03:20:39 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-05-10
MD5: 48f1f5e26ceae4ee0795e2d4eb52eced SHA-1: 7f1e65c4b0e1bbf230e512ea5c3cb70976fc5a01 SHA-256: af5a01a9350ce5ee7d47e4d25f3e49a3633d19efa88ccc2271406c382a1a9679
224 Risk Score

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 6

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • PDF link to algorithmically-generated URL high PDF_RANDOM_URL_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) link whose host looks algorithmically generated (pronounceable-random labels) and whose path/query carries a long high-entropy token. This is the randomized-redirector pattern of malspam phishing lures — the visible document is only a prompt — not a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ggtraff.ru/strik?keyword=cosa+nostra+rules+pdf In PDF document text
    • http://files.lilprofamilychildcareandpreschool.com/uploads/1/3/0/9/130969176/pituwexi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://jibawuli.goldcreeksec2a.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131636664/99c6f06.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://zamiwabo.tipsyglasswinery.com/uploads/1/3/2/7/132740829/4b7cb0f7ddc829a.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://zusemanag.brurosa.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131438304/lefetudi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://puzas.worldclasstitle.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130776068/1d7ffd9336.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1043939.mozfiles.com/files/1043939/bukatokilabugab.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1037860.mozfiles.com/files/1037860/bowudulekidosopunevupage.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/8bc2b72b-fac6-41b0-a1c5-1206f902cdb3/87422001447.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/a17cbe87-81c0-4b55-b1d1-97ccea57ec52/46169792936.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/89fc8714-6b2c-47bd-9900-6ffbe82f532a/talukinapiratagijovinoxaf.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/30cd7f9b-9fc1-4a09-9589-978b7bf49a74/82369454790.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/e6fbcd1a-7ade-4442-9034-9a4ea0568bbb/virujilutelawujosule.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/97f14f94-8669-4c69-a100-e8e8be45c340/97693634440.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/2bf95028-9c53-47fa-bea1-a427c2c9886e/30234898321.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00008df1.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x8DF1 4940 bytes
SHA-256: e228365e127ae13e2fc47f6d5214c6af18218af17fd934aa71782710bc2a824c
font_01_sfnt_off00009ec5.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x9EC5 10556 bytes
SHA-256: 2b3800258df8dd46ede0a1f0966c960276a7ef896d5d50bd40f13e56819f1cb7

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