Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 af0a3d9220bb5576…

MALICIOUS

PDF

44.8 KB Created: 2020-11-09 08:40:45 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-01-23
MD5: 3bc0c6005496ffdf7647f00735516eb3 SHA-1: cc2b0eedcbec06beb4ba6455be2345b971d4a32a SHA-256: af0a3d9220bb5576c760193d17fa44196ca47e94fcbaaa9c6adf4ffe94412923
126 Risk Score

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://trafficel.ru/aws?keyword=what+comes+after+quadrillionaire PDF link annotation
    • https://bitekiparoduj.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/0/134017536/titigubi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zavegaligap.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134499553/movisib.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://rajivuwos.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134398668/pukum.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xigepeseforala.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134508125/matapiwadivageg.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kirugivedipabaw.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134464293/2774637.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://gekitudijelal.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/2/134265938/9e77424127143.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://nijubalalo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131453980/3604300.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xexovelez.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130813416/c7a908e008530fa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://desinijedugo.files.wordpress.com/2020/11/79403578460.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/8511a591-7d2d-424b-b0fa-8f779ee1a79a/jilbere_de_paris_scissors.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/d2daa730-b065-449a-b8db-9eb24b4f505f/97583621805.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://moxafila.files.wordpress.com/2020/11/rufus_multiboot_usb.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kuwibanaxar.files.wordpress.com/2020/11/32802357695.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/d6bf20b5-d88e-4bdc-b78f-8c108746972a/41559462417.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00006456.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6456 5400 bytes
SHA-256: 02ec56642ed24bc970c5c6218a8cc63cd1ee2fa13ecdc61b3611d1e258ad2663
font_01_sfnt_off0000768a.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x768A 2284 bytes
SHA-256: a81efffa75c967d1bc98efefb4ce87308f9622f6ae59e545ca068a02710c0409
font_02_sfnt_off000080ca.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x80CA 10792 bytes
SHA-256: aa797e3db9629a4dfbbad251617a15ada431a3e9b6209ef46c6be1327939a23b

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