Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 aedfffecf383c2a3…

MALICIOUS

PDF

85.7 KB Created: 2021-06-30 02:13:11 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3)
MD5: c4d9462c596dd1862b6e836a39633f21 SHA-1: f246fbd2dea3fc5f4ac81ff1271f8ae6dbc5f38f SHA-256: aedfffecf383c2a3300df283365bf179babb8a00ca69e302040e46731f6bddc4
236 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File T1059.001 PowerShell

The PDF document contains numerous links to compromised WordPress sites, suggesting a link farm designed to host malicious content. Heuristics indicate lures for browser extension installation and clipboard command execution, common social engineering tactics. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly indicate malicious intent, likely to trick users into downloading and executing further payloads.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9972

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • Clipboard command execution lure high SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LURE
    Document tells the user to copy or paste clipboard content into Run, PowerShell, cmd, or another shell-like execution context
  • Browser extension / update installation lure high SE_BROWSER_INSTALL_LURE
    Document tells the user to install a browser extension, plugin, viewer, or browser update to view content — a common social-engineering path for credential theft and malware installation
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://catamma.ru/uplcv?utm_term=extract+embedded+video+from+pdf
    • https://robertmatzuzi-massagetherapist.co.uk/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1608ff6e1e25fe---40613903400.pdf
    • http://www.commandinglife.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1606c9f5b58d0d---rabazi.pdf
    • http://aliceinformaticasrl.com/user/pages/31876148308.pdf
    • http://to-tuong.com/media/ckfinder/files/delusebekegiterune.pdf
    • http://www.kissdocs.com.au/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1609bdd124ba75---69939677690.pdf
    • https://alatheir.com/atheirwsfiles/file/18875625499.pdf
    • http://cageart.ca/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160732e7f18a6c---xibovejinapaxefumek.pdf
    • https://musikkursus.dk/userfiles/file/69289909554.pdf
    • https://srp-galabau-rostock.de/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/cpp2a5l38s10h1c074sbemp433/kinewajomuje.pdf
    • https://www.davidwoodpersonnel.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1606cd62a1e564---vavijenaxu.pdf
    • http://alnoorcity.com/userfiles/file/75034588271.pdf
    • https://thealloywheelcentre.co.uk/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/919d2f82df0bf7571183b268b2edfebd/618061426.pdf
    • http://windcampus.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16076efd9b1efc---jazubibapajonuzuve.pdf
    • https://qamarapps.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160c7053e28c43---89553104696.pdf
    • http://arniestribu.com/campannas/file/93577440262.pdf
    • https://popa.com.br/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/40950cb350eee1b51c6c0b4efd6fa8be/lonajotawolijugazedalowub.pdf
    • https://www.hotel-palladium.gr/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/ceujt4htkn62hdel7nobs8qqs5/63269969234.pdf
    • https://dienlanhhonganh.com/images/pic/file/38447969349.pdf
    • https://promocionesnma.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/e84f583ab4d1e700d65698989f3e4859/47437770111.pdf
    • https://ambientltg.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/a8d1e2b0e6e96d54e7d80a6c14c2dad5/powowesapamejamuletuwu.pdf
    • http://www.phonefixcomo.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1606e52512e5dd---dezitaxixunafejakize.pdf
    • https://news.yahoo.co.jpMy
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/License

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000e93e.bin
9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE93E 16792 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00010155.bin
5b7e2c86ff79e8e1c3c940e11bb4b0f6d6a132233b323f59d1371edf138229f6		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x10155 10752 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off000119e7.bin
6c93b2fdc70172952f45dea5c6416c4aa937c1b68f1147723ac801b59411d804		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x119E7 18156 bytes

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