Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 ae96d91898e6bb8a…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

1.27 MB Created: 2022-11-01 14:58:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 14.0000 First seen: 2022-11-11
MD5: 84c053b69da8529e782ddd5d61e684c1 SHA-1: 59e7505409646de514521f3da837c4bb97b21d8c SHA-256: ae96d91898e6bb8a6d579c508bdfb4a447d9f9263b053a187eef751a7d2d690b
230 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059.003 Windows Command Shell T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample contains a VBA macro with a Document_Open subroutine that utilizes Shell() and CreateObject() calls. The macro appears to download and execute a second-stage payload. The reconstructed command line suggests persistence is established via the Run key: HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\IAccessible2Proxy.

Heuristics 7

  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.afc5c039d11fd238-9978787-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.afc5c039d11fd238-9978787-0
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • Environ() call (env variable access) low OLE_VBA_ENVIRON
    Environ() call (env variable access)
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
af4a0b55f00cd68b4754dfb545b505248545ebe959bfbee1898bf83403cc69a0
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 17511 bytes
vbaProject_00.bin
55200b66d9c6d9c00d3f14a248e77292891253a1c7cf74a1ab0818836d729eb6
vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 36864 bytes