Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLSX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 ae8f1fee0ab77ea5…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLSX

2.62 MB First seen: 2026-05-13
MD5: 177b3228e0f9867c38e28a20261596f5 SHA-1: 641a09cfe7c94a1ea840198f21253879251335be SHA-256: ae8f1fee0ab77ea5d9e4687da70a6e11592b8cc2d14b2fc736ebf02be2726d34
100 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1559.002 Component Object Model Hijacking

The primary indicator is the presence of an Equation Editor OLE object, a common technique used to deliver exploits. While no specific exploit or payload was identified in the static analysis, this object strongly suggests an attempt to leverage a vulnerability within the Equation Editor component. The document body was truncated and did not provide further context.

Heuristics 2

  • Equation Editor Ole10Native payload — CVE-2017-11882 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE
    An embedded Microsoft Equation 3.0 object (CLSID 0002CE02-0000-0000-C000-000000000046) carries an Ole10Native packager stream instead of the normal Equation Native/MTEF data. This is the weaponized Equation Editor RCE delivery shape used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 maldocs. The payload (font-record overflow + shellcode) is frequently encrypted and the stream name case-scrambled to evade scanners, but an Equation object holding an Ole10Native stream has no benign use.
  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Contains Equation Editor object — related to CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploitation, but CLSID presence alone is not the malformed MTEF exploit primitive.

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
ole10native_00.bin ole-package OLE Ole10Native stream: OlE10nAtIVE 2728662 bytes
SHA-256: dc44b2b0d2c90561b91e5e48584689849c89246f29476892ab7cf520a1ce3606

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