RTF malware analysis — malicious · ae8d7f27cc03b84d

MALICIOUS

RTF

101.6 KB First seen: 2024-10-06

MD5: 90fd80481e6ff4475cbf3ade38425eb2 SHA-1: 261df7f5756fd5bb8b325131ca5249382759eecc SHA-256: ae8d7f27cc03b84dda1b66fe17d2026165427c69bfe5908d5ba514ed38e21ce5

160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1566.001 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment T1204.001 Malicious Execution: User Execution: Malicious Link

The file is an RTF document that contains embedded OLE objects, specifically targeting the Equation Editor vulnerability. The presence of RTF_OBJDATA, RTF_OBJAUTLINK, RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR, and RTF_OBJUPDATE heuristics indicates a high likelihood of exploitation. This exploit is designed to execute arbitrary code, which is typically used to download and run a second-stage malicious payload.

Heuristics 4

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK

RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00001a0d.bin` `1fafed45d32fea3c6f2476a33aa056e7a0d613d78ef4bcbbaa7fd9fe9e7e8f7f`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x1A0D	2012 bytes

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.