Malicious PDF / .VIR — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 ae7582e01e53b2d1…

MALICIOUS

PDF / .VIR

61.9 KB Created: 2024-02-19 16:39:23 Authoring application: pdf-parser First seen: 2024-05-07
MD5: 4392daa889230aaf34a7e91d534ce450 SHA-1: 982fc69c5cbc71aa1af92b49db12d58bff5487a4 SHA-256: ae7582e01e53b2d1cc898ec2048ca67a263fb8b2f256065628e84152e23288af
224 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The PDF file uses an image-based lure, presenting itself as a negotiation guide to trick users into clicking a link. This link, identified as a redirector, leads to a non-reputable host, likely for phishing or malware distribution. The ClamAV detection and multiple high-severity heuristics confirm the malicious intent of this document.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier clean score 0.0679

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • PDF link to algorithmically-generated URL high PDF_RANDOM_URL_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) link whose host looks algorithmically generated (pronounceable-random labels) and whose path/query carries a long high-entropy token. This is the randomized-redirector pattern of malspam phishing lures — the visible document is only a prompt — not a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Image lure linking to an SEO redirector (free-download phishing) high PDF_SEO_UTM_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF embeds an image with little or no body text and a clickable link to a multi-word utm_term / FeedBurner-proxied SEO redirector — the 'free ebook / solution-manual / document download' phishing family that ranks for natural-language search queries and routes the user into a payload/redirect chain. The PDF carries no exploit; the risk is the linked destination. Flagged structurally (image lure + SEO redirector) so it does not depend on a ClamAV/ML signature, and regardless of how many filler text pages the lure carries.
  • Clickable PDF combines external action with parser-evasion structure high PDF_ACTION_PARSER_EVASION
    PDF has an external clickable URI together with object graph or xref structures that make parsers disagree, such as divergent duplicate objects, parser divergence, or xref offset mismatch. That combination is stronger than a plain link: the document is both an outward-action carrier and a parser-confusion/evasion sample.
  • Image-only document with action trigger (screenshot lure) medium PDF_IMAGE_LURE
    PDF has 2 image(s), only 0 text block(s), carries a click-outward action, and is only 61 KB — typical shape of a phishing lure where a full-page screenshot hides a clickable button that launches or submits to an attacker URL.
  • Image-only PDF lure with a single link to a non-reputable host medium PDF_IMAGE_LURE_NONREPUTABLE_LINK
    PDF is image-heavy with little real text and its only clickable action is a single external link to a host that is not known-good. This is the canonical malspam carrier shape — a screenshot-like 'click to view' page whose sole purpose is to funnel the victim to one redirect/landing URL on a compromised or throwaway domain. Flagged suspicious rather than malicious because the link alone (no shortener / typosquat / brand path) is the only corroborator beyond the image lure.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://tusumaza.ydeepty.com/973099959?zunabaduwekafokaguwefefewitop=guzabavigawaximizuwamerikadarizuwixokopekopigumuturitefamoweteviwibamodajuxabanaxejuwososoruzedulezoxewezufinalewisojubawevatabufapigejuzijoserufiwisaxexurijugevojudebadedeparorobozadunaxabafesivawemanemela&utm_term=fisher+and+ury+getting+to+yes+pdf&tufuvuluxiziximedikatavezelitatazozakanebakusojosagorub=guwamiroseroguzifozanerutifadajogogulavuviziwedimederibanivofozudotivuxumagotevuvumagadajaxufovuxedimawariliparudoleme In PDF document text
    • https://tusumaza.ydeepty.com/973099959?zunabaduwekafokaguwefefewitop=guzabavigawaximizuwamerikadarizuwixokopekopigumuturitefamoweteviwibamodajuxabanaxejuwososoruzedulezoxewezufinalewisojubawevatabufapigejuzijoserufiwisaxexurijugevojudebadedeparorobozadunaxabafesivawemanemela&utm_term=fisher+and+ury+In PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off0000cedd.bin)
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off0000cedd.bin)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000cedd.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xCEDD 13192 bytes
SHA-256: e06991e0020939f6a772309f7cc02fbe0b9a71a5f0b310b415613bf681891550