RTF / .DOC malware analysis — malicious · ae7270bfe4f24454

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

155.0 KB

MD5: 5618958e349818ddceef848af3885482 SHA-1: b72e7deade0170b314b6ff367d7627747bb2d4f9 SHA-256: ae7270bfe4f244540f95f29fd6913d92ef4160b50474501b9d3d340101832eef

182 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.001 PowerShell

The RTF file contains an embedded OLE object that exploits the Equation Editor vulnerability (CVE-2017-11882). This vulnerability is known to be used for arbitrary code execution. The decoded object data suggests a PE file was embedded, likely a second-stage payload. No document body text was available for analysis, but the critical heuristics strongly indicate exploitation.

Heuristics 5

Equation Editor OLE1 native payload — CVE-2017-11882 related critical CVE related CVE_2017_11882_RELATED

RTF decodes to an OLE1 Equation.3 embedded object whose native data is large and payload-like, and \objupdate requests automatic activation. This is the delivery shape used by Equation Editor RCE documents such as CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802, but the malformed MTEF record needed for exact attribution was not recovered.
Decoded Equation Editor payload + PE critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF decodes to an Equation Editor ProgID adjacent to OLE activation and the same decoded object stream contains embedded PE bytes. This matches the Equation Editor exploit surface used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 documents, while requiring payload evidence to avoid flagging benign Equation references.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE

One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00000990.bin` `5e55fa5318ff64232d69a6a3d8929b95cb3bc866260ca069b6a58a3533ce20f6`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x990	78049 bytes
Detection ClamAV: No threats found Obfuscation or payload: likely Carved artifact entropy is 8.00, consistent with packed or encrypted content.

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