Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 ae71e509c2e0fabc…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

243.2 KB Created: 2021-03-21 16:44:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 14.0000
MD5: c6af03c56e3747b29c633b29ff152f9f SHA-1: 02a42482f4bbff68dc8d7959f584354a46b228c2 SHA-256: ae71e509c2e0fabce80afd4b37d9c1d839fa2e391400ab2cc613a269205b88fb
69 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1559.001 Component Object Model Hijacking

The sample is a Microsoft Office document containing an embedded OLE object. Heuristics indicate this object is a risky file type, specifically a JAR archive, suggesting it's intended to deliver a secondary payload. The presence of an embedded OLE object is the primary indicator of malicious intent.

Heuristics 4

  • Ole10Native package carries executable/script file type high OFFICE_PACKAGE_RISKY_FILE
    OLE Package displayName or fullPath ends in an executable or script-capable extension. Even without UI extension spoofing, embedding a runnable payload inside an Office document is a high-risk delivery pattern.
  • Embedded OLE object medium OOXML_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an embedded OLE object
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
ooxml_oleobject_00.bin
38125eb194529697a475572e17aeb4ed20b9c1083d8a92ebf63383ac72c8afba
ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin 237056 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 7.98, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
ooxml_oleobject_00_ole10native_00.bin
7320a956d4ee43f85712e927fb85b850d6f4205812168b67cdf8aa6d8b733eb6
ole-package OOXML word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin Ole10Native stream: Ole10Native 232895 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 8.00, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
emf_00.emf
d8bdcb4eed40822604acc9180299212b7628c089e89ae2d65deab376498fc605
ooxml-emf OOXML EMF part: word/media/image2.emf 5148 bytes