RTF malware analysis — malicious · ae6c0eeffd364619

MALICIOUS

RTF

928.2 KB

MD5: aba54d0a15a45b88c4708ebe8f571ecc SHA-1: fc3171b4a4d2b63c7f73f16436e53a7a78293511 SHA-256: ae6c0eeffd3646190bd567a5c6ab19ce43994c0e02bf380f2a8eb3f2f75741e0

162 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.003 Windows Command Shell T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

The sample is an RTF document that contains an embedded OLE object, specifically targeting the Equation Editor vulnerability. The heuristic firings indicate that the RTF document contains decoded Equation Editor payload and a PE file, suggesting it's designed to exploit this vulnerability. The presence of ".objdata" and ".objupdate" further supports the exploitation of OLE object activation. The primary attack vector is likely through a spearphishing attachment, leading to the execution of a malicious payload that downloads further content.

Heuristics 5

Decoded Equation Editor payload + PE critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF decodes to an Equation Editor ProgID adjacent to OLE activation and the same decoded object stream contains embedded PE bytes. This matches the Equation Editor exploit surface used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 documents, while requiring payload evidence to avoid flagging benign Equation references.
Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK

RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE

One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off000006e1.bin` `116b66c89c5adadc34947a4e4cc2edcf525c807fb39cc62fa214b067031245b3`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x6E1	474265 bytes
Detection ClamAV: No threats found Obfuscation or payload: likely Carved artifact entropy is 8.00, consistent with packed or encrypted content.

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