Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 ae55d0419b0ea8a5…

MALICIOUS

PDF

90.7 KB Created: 2021-01-07 21:19:51 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-11-02
MD5: e628719f73115fce038e2ad6dc913b1c SHA-1: 719cf6f3e0b5134a3787f25a91de53ff806c756d SHA-256: ae55d0419b0ea8a5e3bfcf9ad43621f823ec7566a5149a72f02eb854c3d339a1
234 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The PDF contains multiple embedded links, with one pointing to known malicious redirector infrastructure. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly indicate malicious intent. The document body, though malformed, contains references to web development terms, suggesting a lure to a compromised or malicious website.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9997

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Malformed active-content stream length medium PDF_MALFORMED_EXPLOIT_STREAM_LENGTH
    A PDF stream that carries active/exploit-looking content has a declared /Length that does not match the recovered stream body. Malformed stream boundaries and length mismatches are common parser-evasion/supporting evidence around Reader exploit streams.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://traffking.ru/aws?utm_term=jquery+ajax+post+json+form+data In PDF document text
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4368989/normal_5fca4c686fa3f.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4401714/normal_5ff35d7b8bf71.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wovupidej.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134687137/mejeje-pabox-zonok-bimijiwajaviwab.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4406241/normal_5fa66fcbbddcc.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/retepisej/ggidihl/71635963527.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4425515/normal_5fc18cee14b2d.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4377642/normal_5fa82d24919b2.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4413973/normal_5fa365b407214.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4500678/normal_5fb5edee90dc8.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/tivuzofep/4jhzvzk/44644065253.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://muwilumi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130813533/7636488.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/vavale/eclipse_java_programming_tutorial.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/tonisefoteka/pipawi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/90936c4d-0c2b-4af0-b4d5-314bb0c755bc/foreign_exchange_student_porn.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
stream_005_off000137be.bin decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x137BE 22036 bytes
SHA-256: ed27681b865a7b6b3825a539ffa126ca51751037ab36c742d0f5480b5bad459f
font_00_sfnt_off0000fcc5.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xFCC5 5516 bytes
SHA-256: dd1df07210de5108891ff79cfec034cf739697b26601982a12d6b2ff047df0f1
font_01_sfnt_off00010f87.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x10F87 11756 bytes
SHA-256: 985d026929ddc9dee0fac191f2043229b718fba6d937eca2b4bb77792b061851

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