Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 ae2f5560e3834441…

MALICIOUS

PDF

85.5 KB Created: 2021-06-26 00:44:52 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3)
MD5: 266b35e84b79fef5f4987ee759d5f026 SHA-1: f410e1ba8695bcf9b880b178ac8505e6e6810efa SHA-256: ae2f5560e38344418afbd43fd68f193f5afcb8d105f1c23c00ad5b6c4e25d753
236 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is a PDF document flagged by ClamAV as a phishing trojan. Heuristics indicate it contains a link farm pointing to compromised WordPress uploads and disposable hosting, suggesting a lure for malicious content. The 'SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE' heuristic strongly suggests the document's purpose is to instruct the user to open a password-protected archive, a common tactic to evade security filters. While no scripts were explicitly extracted, the PDF format itself can embed JavaScript, and the overall structure points to a malicious download attempt.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9951

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • PDF link to algorithmically-generated URL high PDF_RANDOM_URL_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) link whose host looks algorithmically generated (pronounceable-random labels) and whose path/query carries a long high-entropy token. This is the randomized-redirector pattern of malspam phishing lures — the visible document is only a prompt — not a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Password-protected archive handoff high SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE
    Document gives password instructions for an archive or attachment — often used to keep payloads encrypted until after gateway scanning
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://childrencareandliteracysociety.org/userfiles/files/1444851948.pdf
    • http://www.hollyskauaicondo.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160882821b5640---kiwik.pdf
    • http://mmprogetti.it/userfiles/files/86469413590.pdf
    • https://riverasphotovideo.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160850d7229157---10201227718.pdf
    • https://divorcioconsensual.com.br/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/81bb5b96991745d349f8dafcd5d5e24f/73620799288.pdf
    • https://bobecoingatlan.com/uploads/editor/file/96783870436.pdf
    • http://frederickfollows.co.uk/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1609df7711a4fc---gofoz.pdf
    • https://akproauto.com/nbloom/fckuploads/file/rupozowijejur.pdf
    • http://austria-ex.com/images/blog//file/24983433194.pdf
    • https://www.ideaklinikankara.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607369c9d1f94---xumarafakisubojenigo.pdf
    • https://sp-pir.ru/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/f2fc513b763c4105c9dd4aa8f4b10018/21381504517.pdf
    • https://ecoinkworld.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/d4bcfbed603ba72440b1f0269c9ad85a/66242555584.pdf
    • https://www.alertgy.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/0e85b27838c5d279b2836ca82ef0570d/52778688638.pdf
    • http://xn--80ahcjevtqq.xn--p1ai/ckfinder/userfiles/files/tejidojasidogiwafujoga.pdf
    • http://insidethedigitaltrend.biz/userfiles/file/28693211663.pdf
    • https://martybermanassociates.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/a7ebc2969ffc9299cfceae9567bbaf4f/963009134.pdf
    • https://istanbulbalbir.com/upload/ckfinder/files/9190889552.pdf
    • https://bursakaynak.com/userfiles/file/surapavinewova.pdf
    • http://hrzservices.com/uploadfiles/file/39379905382.pdf
    • https://benqmusicworkshop.com/fupload/file/simizizuxexabojufuvul.pdf
    • https://wurstfargo.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/bb766f00d4185d40fb49e66d3fdfe683/38094946123.pdf
    • https://mattweidnerlaw.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16086d3d61a747---xiretojipazuferunubaguxu.pdf
    • http://aire-limpio.com/img/editor/file/nawomi.pdf
    • https://prawobrzeze.info/userfiles/file/974066249.pdf
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/skout/mBVl/~3/3CAf4wW3hvY/uplcv?utm_term=disk+utility+linux
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/License

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000ed48.bin
9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xED48 16792 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0001055a.bin
b1a2eae1d19c7db2efdf69ffeb712f655f18df79f3f7ee7292bcb61f35d11828
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1055A 17980 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off000132fb.bin
d7789457a6bac65f44be52abf84f522fd2312a07c84867238212525f0f72a9fd
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x132FB 9996 bytes