RTF / .DOC malware analysis — malicious · ae22d6cc4669f4e7

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

31.6 KB First seen: 2023-01-10

MD5: 03210d6a52789ad39ccbb7f12e837e4d SHA-1: 358641ec11229d4ce26d30edc42745d81543882e SHA-256: ae22d6cc4669f4e7f6d38b4a28eb17be794afa04c5588186b968a6f88b5a3a02

140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1204 User Execution: Malicious Link

The RTF document contains an OLE object with an embedded Equation Editor ProgID, and an objupdate directive that forces OLE activation. The document body contains a lure instructing the user to 'Enable editing', which is a common technique to bypass macro security settings and trigger exploits. This suggests the file is designed to exploit a vulnerability, likely within the Equation Editor component, to execute a secondary payload.

Heuristics 4

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE

Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00004fe0.bin` `aa6426bdd9671779c8b6ad3d43448cee3550a1abc3b6c49920939765973d4493`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x4FE0	1331 bytes

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