RTF malware analysis — malicious · ae1ffbd6408649a5

MALICIOUS

RTF

65.1 KB First seen: 2023-08-08

MD5: dfd8b48d20dff29d4881b11e224ab08f SHA-1: b9872a73c19432e83a7a2e90063d782073667194 SHA-256: ae1ffbd6408649a583bafadf961a0eb20adc52519dbe39f54f2067b7e4ae0f2a

140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is an RTF document that contains an embedded OLE object and specifically targets the Equation Editor vulnerability. The document body contains a lure instructing the user to 'click Enable editing', which is a common tactic to bypass security measures and trigger the exploit. The presence of RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR and RTF_OBJUPDATE heuristics strongly indicates exploitation of this component.

Heuristics 4

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE

Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00002671.bin` `497382c739e797aa5ebfb0c60be2effa88613a13b20b17811669732617abc921`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x2671	1668 bytes

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