Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 ae15d92f716a409a…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

373.8 KB Created: 2022-08-10 05:43:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 14.0000 First seen: 2022-08-10
MD5: 59ae8cd912f4bfb31fda9c1c063c0f92 SHA-1: 7913b0e94e6446dc946d981317810d524108f44e SHA-256: ae15d92f716a409a83ca57197333ed2e690a8d8427b6693a581f4100f7f77546
84 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1559 Component Object Model Hijacking T1559.001 Component Object Model Hijacking: Component Object Model Hijacking

The file is a Microsoft Office document containing an embedded OLE object. Heuristics indicate that this OLE object is a package that drops an auto-executable payload, specifically identified as a JAR file. This suggests the document is designed to deliver and execute a secondary malicious component upon opening.

Heuristics 4

  • Ole10Native package drops an auto-executable payload critical OFFICE_PACKAGE_RISKY_FILE
    OLE Package displayName or fullPath ends in a directly auto-executable extension (a runnable binary or a script the default shell host runs on double-click). Embedding such a payload inside an Office document has no benign authoring use — it is a malware-delivery dropper.
  • Embedded OLE object medium OOXML_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an embedded OLE object
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
ooxml_oleobject_00.bin
e0e71a8464346949cf3c6f2ff282342e5a79719aaaf9ca2fffdd254c11047628		 ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin 197120 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 7.97, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
ooxml_oleobject_00_ole10native_00.bin
6d66bf419bf58d9b30185185cf3b065f6632f4990fbd07d7e786cdda351b0b8e		 ole-package OOXML word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin Ole10Native stream: Ole10Native 192715 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 8.00, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
emf_00.emf
572a982eba1cc525a828f4469bff4d0840edcb323bcf8e375f38ff3ecf150b16		 ooxml-emf OOXML EMF part: word/media/image3.emf 5464 bytes

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