Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 adc70b67f2ec534c…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

62.7 KB Created: 1996-12-17 01:32:42 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel
MD5: a07043e777fc6d0e4bcc8deee8334250 SHA-1: 9da69d0b68632e498164d786a73e4494e4f37b8d SHA-256: adc70b67f2ec534c22c9c96579af932dfabdd11375b8029d90421c1967a8afdc
220 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample exhibits high-confidence heuristics for WinExec, LoadLibrary, and GetProcAddress API calls, indicating dynamic code execution capabilities. Additionally, XOR-encoded strings were detected, suggesting obfuscation techniques are in use. The OLE slack anomaly further points to a potentially packed or intentionally malformed structure. Without a document body or scripts, the exact payload and delivery mechanism remain unclear, but the API usage strongly suggests the execution of a secondary malicious component.

Heuristics 5

  • XOR-encoded strings (key 0x03) critical SC_XOR_ENCODED
    Found 8 Windows library/API name(s) XOR-encoded with single-byte key 0x03: 'VirtualAlloc', 'VirtualAlloc', 'VirtualAllocEx', 'VirtualProtect', 'VirtualProtectEx', 'CreateProcessA', 'WriteProcessMemory', 'ReadProcessMemory'
  • Reference to WinExec API high SC_STR_WINEXEC
    Reference to WinExec API
  • Reference to LoadLibrary API high SC_STR_LOADLIBRARY
    Reference to LoadLibrary API
  • Reference to GetProcAddress API high SC_STR_GETPROCADDRESS
    Reference to GetProcAddress API
  • OLE document has large unaccounted-for region high OLE_SLACK_ANOMALY
    OLE file is 64,240 bytes but its declared streams total only 24,565 bytes — 39,675 bytes (62%) live in unallocated sector slack. This is the canonical hiding place for pre-macro-era Office exploit payloads (XOR-encoded shellcode reached via a parser pointer-corruption bug in the document structure).

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.