Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 adc39a0ad2706609…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

536.4 KB First seen: 2021-09-29
MD5: 21926e4c6197b0e04ed60d3f7878f094 SHA-1: d2dd748a9992e80647a54c0dfef4f6a848ef3d0b SHA-256: adc39a0ad27066098b272d68378e904e31a11e8d847ded6a9796dde0d6773a59
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF document contains multiple embedded OLE objects, with heuristics indicating automatic linking and update triggers. This suggests the document is designed to exploit OLE object activation to execute arbitrary code upon opening. The 'SE_ENABLE_LURE' heuristic further supports this, indicating the document likely contains instructions to bypass macro security. No specific malware family is identifiable from the provided evidence.

Heuristics 6

  • Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATED
    RTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 3 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000bb0.bin
e906c1cdcfe01ee725b9a9ceb5a5293e3bc99cb1cd599cd8228959df1fb502bd
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xBB0 171558 bytes
objdata_01_off00057e39.bin
9d9bc825f2fa5e0ed8db7dce6823e199ad9c775873472d42887214589f205470
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x57E39 2632 bytes
objdata_02_off000593dc.bin
44deae4627fee3c44f54d5bd10477ec2e17f4c08135f08e2417832e36d10d037
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x593DC 12297 bytes