Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 ad8b5abab3abf299…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

2.01 MB Created: 2019-09-17 13:59:00
MD5: b6d0c501688b153efed2422110bae630 SHA-1: d8f9ab80bcfc42f05c55a7f78728b30355152a78 SHA-256: ad8b5abab3abf299e4e08b103adaebfad4c417ecda6a56a9253a0fd2aab2160f
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.001 PowerShell T1204.001 Malicious Link

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object that is updated via \objupdate, triggering exploitation of CVE-2017-8759. This vulnerability allows for arbitrary code execution, likely to download and run a second-stage payload. The presence of RTF_OBJDATA, RTF_OBJEMB, and RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR heuristics further supports the exploitation of embedded objects within the RTF structure.

Heuristics 6

  • CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759
    RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
  • Equation Editor CLSID critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Equation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off001ef6bd.bin
dce1dc77d89a56f2218cb42ed78710c8edb477c2d8a4de41e8ed9c0024114246		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1EF6BD 3732 bytes

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