Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 ad4896d5043087ac…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

26.6 KB
MD5: a9a2860d746b942b0d8c41ef47c080d4 SHA-1: db119a96732c9bc095728f9efb18456291483305 SHA-256: ad4896d5043087acf9bfdb2426c6f5b8095dd0ba63fb989425a82fa3088bcb22
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The RTF document contains OLE object data and specifically triggers an OLE activation via \objupdate. Critical heuristics indicate the exploitation of a vulnerability within the Equation Editor component. This suggests the document is designed to execute code, likely to download and run a secondary payload, as indicated by the RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR and RTF_OBJUPDATE firings.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0000208d.bin
dcb988c8288578620f3034e1d3b87fb620ecc3802cf4b0518dda2fe4d07055c3
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x208D 1747 bytes