Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 ad47cf796e352dc8…

MALICIOUS

RTF

229.8 KB Created: 2021-02-12 04:30:00
MD5: 57a432ef3e91c0d305dacc0290404d0e SHA-1: ae15c61a849fa9d904b6818e5e234cbb216323b5 SHA-256: ad47cf796e352dc815d08c0becffa31c19cfc2805c572eb07127a74966098fb7
262 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF file contains an embedded OLE object that exploits the CVE-2017-11882 vulnerability in the Equation Editor. This vulnerability allows for arbitrary code execution, which is a critical finding. The ClamAV signature Rtf.Exploit.CVE_2018_0802-6825822-0 further confirms the malicious nature of the file. The document body content appears to be unrelated filler text, suggesting the exploit is the primary malicious function.

Heuristics 7

  • CVE-2017-11882 — Equation Editor FONT record overflow critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882
    Equation Editor MTEF contains an overlong FONT typeface field, the vulnerable copy primitive for CVE-2017-11882. This is stronger evidence than the Equation Editor CLSID alone because it identifies the malformed record that drives code execution in EQNEDT32.EXE.
  • Equation Editor CLSID critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Equation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
  • ClamAV: Rtf.Exploit.CVE_2018_0802-6825822-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Rtf.Exploit.CVE_2018_0802-6825822-0
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000106.bin
bea89d2d808c4a042210674bb7f25b9f3d9afc0e4daa65fd7adbf82162da1d70		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x106 3628 bytes

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