Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOCX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 ad35cd260cfd5be3…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOCX

50.5 KB Created: 2025-07-01 10:39:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000
MD5: 318ee3c8de807ea296ed6dcbde18e7e5 SHA-1: ec52a709e5aea98961a4b85d4e8d281d11be32ef SHA-256: ad35cd260cfd5be38fbbbaa24dcd852f65b88dce15773060376d362d17ff9078
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell T1559.001 Component Object Model Hijacking

The OOXML document utilizes an altChunk to import an external RTF file named 'Cambodia.rtf'. This RTF file contains OLE objects, and the \objupdate directive within it forces their activation. This mechanism is commonly used to execute embedded malicious code, such as downloading and running a second-stage payload. The presence of OLE object data and the objupdate directive strongly suggests an attempt to exploit vulnerabilities or deliver malware.

Heuristics 5

  • altChunk imports embedded RTF (RTF injection) critical OOXML_ALTCHUNK_RTF
    Document inlines an embedded RTF via an aFChunk relationship and a <w:altChunk> body element. This is the canonical RTF-injection wrapper used to smuggle RTF exploits (Equation Editor / URL Moniker / objdata) past DOCX-only scanners. Word opens the wrapper and executes the RTF inline. Recursing into the RTF for the exact exploit primitive.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    (in altChunk RTF word/Cambodia.rtf) RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    (in altChunk RTF word/Cambodia.rtf) RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    (in altChunk RTF word/Cambodia.rtf) RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://opendope.org/xpaths
    • http://opendope.org/conditions
    • http://opendope.org/questions
    • http://opendope.org/components
    • http://opendope.org/SmartArt/DataHierarchy
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/schemaLibrary/2006/main
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/chart
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/chartDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/diagram
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/picture
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/spreadsheetDrawing
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2008/diagram
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/bibliography
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/compatibility
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/lockedCanvas

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00003a12.bin
cc147e47a01a9f5b5d60f71a3cac5159d2f88df5a8aa7d303e9612a0ec5b2860		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x3A12 88398 bytes
objdata_01_off00039d01.bin
9e8b68393d57d3e633893d134c107c3da58d6e56a7e72494dca54b9ee885b5f4		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x39D01 584266 bytes

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