Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 ad268886b8e58109…

MALICIOUS

PDF

54.7 KB Created: 2020-08-30 06:30:28 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: bdf9e2bf65fc9e8ead23ebd874bb7f26 SHA-1: d33dcaca04fb3f1b2f39387b759f8eaeda9ebd62 SHA-256: ad268886b8e581096294e914c842ffe0b11754ac762218bca643dfb16adc1c0e
150 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious Link

The PDF contains a link farm designed to redirect users to malicious infrastructure, masquerading as a software download. The primary malicious URL identified is https://ttraff.cc/wix?keyword=dxcpl+directx+11+emulator. The document body, though heavily obfuscated, contains references to this URL and other benign-looking PDF links, likely part of a SEO poisoning or link farm tactic.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 3

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.cc/wix?keyword=dxcpl+directx+11+emulator
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/a91264_562b04bb981740cf978473e6f9483093.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/ca300b_75e131a4ac334009a259b55768d8a216.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/63d3ad_9ec4e87b1b904d88845540fb7f49d25d.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_766294f9829343e69533363d1e0b2827.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/238140_9c2551896b1b446782f5d37e86a6773e.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/6825/2565/files/93686507756.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/2084/5210/files/nixilozevoxunub.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/6305/0394/files/warrior_fury_talents.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0435/5738/8440/files/glory_rank_brave.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/4681/4374/files/nys_ela_released_questions_2017.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/7266/8319/files/nisadifila.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0436/0906/3586/files/sunagapovora.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/3059/3192/files/.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_58ab13cd913f46148ffee3d58e94a141.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/97aff7_17180b25ee13421ca834bf5ee1860503.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_1ef8185cef494594b8e83a61472476df.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_0a42262263df4cbd8bf878a3eda5f33c.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00008e03.bin
d8e29f0027423ef69dae06142a4e15dbda2a5277fb2e7f051fb1b7cb3de4bd99
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x8E03 5160 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00009f89.bin
fd63f0d2cc551e3b8d7d60ee35c2b9f9c2d9604d6c6de6f39e062e45f57572dd
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x9F89 14688 bytes