Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 ad0c375b42d92592…

MALICIOUS

PDF

69.9 KB Created: 2021-09-16 01:00:28 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3)
MD5: 03ebcee22b29bb8623d91d1bfe09263f SHA-1: ad0dd9d0d765245b809d6a1d45d5bf54efe06a57 SHA-256: ad0c375b42d925929ca863f247b321143a565620d21848a49b319c669e105747
192 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

This PDF document is identified as malicious by ML classifiers and ClamAV, indicating a phishing or trojan delivery attempt. The document employs a screenshot lure, typical of phishing campaigns, to entice users to click on embedded links. Embedded JavaScript streams are present, suggesting potential for exploitation or further payload delivery. The numerous external URIs point to compromised CMS uploads and disposable hosting, reinforcing the malicious intent.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9975

Heuristics 9

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Image-only document with action trigger (screenshot lure) medium PDF_IMAGE_LURE
    PDF has 1 image(s), only 0 text block(s), carries a click-outward action, and is only 69 KB — typical shape of a phishing lure where a full-page screenshot hides a clickable button that launches or submits to an attacker URL.
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Urgency / deadline lure low SE_URGENCY_LURE
    Document contains urgency or deadline language ('account will be terminated', 'action required within 24 hours', etc.) — useful context, but low-signal without other findings
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://huntic.ru/uplcv?utm_term=mathematical+physics+by+hk+dass+solution+manual+pdf
    • http://kaymccarthy.com/immagini/file/jekuzikotujubuse.pdf
    • https://jeevandeepspecialcare.com/ckeditor/ckfinder/userfiles/files/dadarexitogamedanezopi.pdf
    • https://aldaserwis.pl/ckfinder/userfiles/files/22197561449.pdf
    • https://mobilaide.com/upload/editor/file/sagosekuxujixutanurewa.pdf
    • https://enville.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1613d2f1095db6---52455238322.pdf
    • https://www.lire-les-notes.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/76001743390.pdf
    • https://maidintown.co.uk/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/b8b3d20da5064fd18f6bc89b6dd7605c/18427882833.pdf
    • https://xn--p3t29jo1ed4o4xw.tw/upload/files/14111977939.pdf
    • https://xo-sound.ru/userfiles/file/xuliwazibeduvebuwe.pdf
    • https://atrax.eu/userfiles/file/58178663771.pdf
    • http://cermak-expo.cz/data/files/file/51032479833.pdf
    • http://marchmont.ru/imgs/file/54963461626.pdf
    • http://profstil.az/userfiles/file/pamifepole.pdf
    • http://slowjamsundays.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/161419642368c3---tixobepem.pdf
    • https://www.vignolaweb.it/ckfinder/userfiles/files/rotuvojozelikurunidipevo.pdf
    • https://vientangluc.com/upload/files/jegazoximofidawupuva.pdf
    • http://www.grundys.com.au/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1613f477967da9---95628229770.pdf
    • https://lashmakerpro.it/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/hre6gnlj0bi55kgbvn070n5li3/nezuzujiloxaliwuvim.pdf
    • https://jvlegacyhomerepairsmd.com/nbloom/fckuploads/file/11070595108.pdf
    • http://e-sportis.com/images/upload/41251835375.pdf
    • https://trucraftsmanship.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16135363df0a55---67840701413.pdf
    • https://www.fifatravels.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/161315f8776da7---poluzubuxotibixumapama.pdf
    • http://imi.vc/upload/files/7557662043.pdf
    • http://garagehayashi.com/js/upload/files/63589933583.pdf
    • http://kaplanpm.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/161411474523a0---14303331521.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/License

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000b505.bin
a34900d9e13c564322272d6658f4ae44fb0c10a18736d5b2ff712bc7f6572487		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xB505 13940 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000d732.bin
9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xD732 16792 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off0000ef49.bin
9168ecb3fdb6cfbad9da41f33ca6f8557b85f3b1fb3c85bef6594b3539601b78		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xEF49 11224 bytes

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