Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 ac6e64a3770bd923…

MALICIOUS

PDF

90.8 KB Created: 2021-06-28 19:03:19 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3)
MD5: 3a0632e6a6f325ede3ed79bd6c02641d SHA-1: 04d37289f12b3c14656767fe6afdd2216b13e9c8 SHA-256: ac6e64a3770bd92304d4a0c8199d839aa9261b6a433469ec69b8e08ef6bfec62
204 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF contains multiple links pointing to external resources, with a high-confidence heuristic identifying a link farm on compromised WordPress upload storage. The ClamAV detection and ML classifier strongly indicate malicious intent, likely to trick users into downloading a secondary payload. No scripts were extracted, but the PDF structure and URL heuristics suggest a phishing or malware distribution attempt.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9966

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • PDF link to algorithmically-generated URL high PDF_RANDOM_URL_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) link whose host looks algorithmically generated (pronounceable-random labels) and whose path/query carries a long high-entropy token. This is the randomized-redirector pattern of malspam phishing lures — the visible document is only a prompt — not a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Visual download / call-to-action button lure low SE_DOWNLOAD_BUTTON
    Document contains a call-to-action phrase ('Click here to download', 'Download Now', etc.) — low-signal unless other findings point to a malicious workflow
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://faltprasten12.se/anvandarbilder/70/files/gexenaxisalidavumonex.pdf
    • https://mamproducciones.es/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160bec26d27f9d---570617076.pdf
    • https://alfa-pechati.ru/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/41d95864e8a3b0c11f5351258123318e/13603896316.pdf
    • https://www.analfissur.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16075d47b6eed0---95595821593.pdf
    • https://bilbox.es/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/753138cdcff518f5432a09b7688c5bc6/92011430815.pdf
    • http://studiotravenzolo.it/userfiles/files/jisaxefisoxugitelu.pdf
    • https://realwebguys.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a4cfbb48d9a---62166360970.pdf
    • http://naturallabs.fr/userfiles/file/gurubenuko.pdf
    • http://www.saraviation.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607e07b2b8d56---48487908552.pdf
    • http://loveperfectionschool.com/upload/file/18441992362.pdf
    • http://www.shipsupply.co.mz/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160cf42e00012f---5067426540.pdf
    • http://doublehappyvstheinfinitesadness.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160971b5778b00---71695717214.pdf
    • http://www.adarshvidhyasankul.org/userfilesfile/5560600988.pdf
    • http://pechati-piter.ru/userfiles/file/rawaxa.pdf
    • http://www.circoloaletrium.it/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a79980a9c6b---45054810621.pdf
    • https://www.davidwoodpersonnel.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1609c987a4291b---boguwadaxukobaxanopigubu.pdf
    • http://k1a.ru/images/files/file/6735678522.pdf
    • https://realestateconnect.biz/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/ur6doump4qf3mvnintq2um4jq6/golefuvaxe.pdf
    • http://afgventuregroup.com/cfiles/file/57793521981.pdf
    • http://www.gunyagder.org.tr/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/sgmsvodc8dbc8od0hf052k71f2/23354557061.pdf
    • https://endoaccessories.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/pnpdpjvpvh60u5h7nmvoudrq4p/11741023020.pdf
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/Uplcv/~3/FevRqgeaUVY/uplcv?utm_term=modal+verbs+exercises+multiple+choice+with+answers+pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/License

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000fbb8.bin
411e241282d0ebc2fbfeffcc5d9c20dfb75380bfd8990ecda5db8c97ba772a08
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xFBB8 11372 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0001162b.bin
9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1162B 16792 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off00012e3d.bin
f906ef50494b3ec460ba04d0e83b70591b4c254d932b4d045448aa5f45107706
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x12E3D 18056 bytes