PDF malware analysis — malicious · ac2b66746d2716bc

MALICIOUS

PDF

9.5 KB

MD5: 38fc0b4f71035c7b295405e04e00a895 SHA-1: 578f3396b8c44927f4a82866178890e68e0a350e SHA-256: ac2b66746d2716bccde94fe74025e4d0b17455af266dd3f52427157955b2b0a1

186 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1059.001 PowerShell T1204.001 Malicious Link T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information

The PDF file contains obfuscated JavaScript, detected by multiple heuristics including ClamAV's Heuristics.PDF.ObfuscatedNameObject. The critical CVE_2007_5659 heuristic indicates the exploitation of a known vulnerability in Adobe Reader via the Collab.collectEmailInfo method to execute a hex-decoded JavaScript stager. This stager is responsible for downloading and executing a second-stage payload.

Heuristics 7

Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 critical CVE exact CVE_2007_5659

PDF JavaScript calls Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 is a buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by a long argument or heap-sprayed message field passed to Collab.collectEmailInfo(). Part of a series of Acrobat JS API exploits. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
ClamAV: Heuristics.PDF.ObfuscatedNameObject critical CLAMAV_DETECTION

ClamAV detected this file as malware: Heuristics.PDF.ObfuscatedNameObject
Annotation subject callee-key hex JavaScript stager high PDF_ANNOT_SUBJECT_CALLEE_HEX_STAGER

PDF JavaScript uses syncAnnotScan()/getAnnots() to read an indirect annotation /Subject stream, percent-decodes it through marker replacement, then uses a callee.toString()-derived key to decode and eval the final exploit stage.
JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT

PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS

PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
syncAnnotScan annotation-staging primitive low PDF_FOXIT_SYNCANNOTSCAN

PDF JavaScript calls syncAnnotScan() — a no-op annotation-enumeration primitive used by exploit-kit JavaScript to stage payload reads from annotation /Subject fields before eval(). Not a vulnerable sink itself; rarely seen in legitimate PDFs. (matched in decompressed stream)
Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE

One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`javascript_obj0007_000.js` `11b03694c4e705ab29873cc5e2c55342ee498b376ac2dc5f05ce17018ef44c38`	pdf-javascript-stream	PDF /JS object 7 at offset 0x19D	264 bytes
`annotation_subject_callee_hex_stage_000.js` `c1e5b474e99f50f4ba5d4f1bb6163461c80284e2c8e79229091825393400f632`	deobfuscated-js	annotation-subject callee-key decoded JavaScript at offset 0x14A	5080 bytes
Detection ClamAV: No threats found Obfuscation or payload: likely Carved artifact contains 5 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
`deobfuscated.js` `d576e390155692b5e1b1cdfbe1285724215c09fa34df5f5fac9dc7413a38000e`	deobfuscated-js	PDF JavaScript deobfuscation pass	71795 bytes
Detection ClamAV: No threats found Obfuscation or payload: likely Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s).

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