Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 ac227b06d3b966ea…

MALICIOUS

PDF

40.0 KB Created: 2020-10-02 17:04:44 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-05-15
MD5: deb7e95181e3812059e65b685d4e6865 SHA-1: f968429ffc4eb46018f54dcfeb47a2c2d6fc1d6a SHA-256: ac227b06d3b966ea9b418bbd7ddca48e18e053c917637a2df96205a1d87988f7
224 Risk Score

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 6

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • PDF link to algorithmically-generated URL high PDF_RANDOM_URL_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) link whose host looks algorithmically generated (pronounceable-random labels) and whose path/query carries a long high-entropy token. This is the randomized-redirector pattern of malspam phishing lures — the visible document is only a prompt — not a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://gettraff.ru/strik?keyword=kaabil+movie+torrent+download In PDF document text
    • http://files.mariettaoddfellows.org/uploads/1/3/0/8/130874253/rosixedewu_vowusu_pumop_wupelemutuloguf.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://jajup.geniihomecare.co.uk/uploads/1/3/0/7/130775934/5020055.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://kiwiba.clickcouriers247.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132695675/wejafipebu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.narinesookram.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132682295/xujiwijivikiruzenin.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.mangialicious.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131379033/271442.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.serbianheritageacademyofcanada.ca/uploads/1/3/1/0/131070912/tovinovabanek_fujozi_suxikemonewute_kalijisisaf.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.justcoconotchanel.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132695455/693368.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/368b0c8b-9355-42bb-b5d0-26f16e6d138b/mototetefudamuzuwigopuwow.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/e2080ac3-b4d4-49a5-a716-c5223f4739c9/kijesinenubudolika.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/d7875825-80a2-4d5f-a9ad-86b808425972/gopopipexenogekizafoga.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/0db13ee8-f24f-4ccb-87dc-1ef8de4a1bdc/48531917274.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0437/6500/6494/files/color_of_claystone.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/4928/6813/files/76882174469.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/6110/9148/files/76308451001.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00005e8f.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x5E8F 5056 bytes
SHA-256: 3181449eacf5b6038d696632ceb7a2527320b58e99cbd425d42959d785e10e56
font_01_sfnt_off00006fbe.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6FBE 10500 bytes
SHA-256: ce3e5cfbcc4af4c3a5797bd674adb8db74eeb83ce0a28802ce6b5724a878d9b0