Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 ac1b6033f306353d…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

13.5 KB
MD5: 79fe90c8cf577e1f2c7282f1bf410ece SHA-1: 8eab87ffe3695754ca9d9229161a0710c0515c24 SHA-256: ac1b6033f306353d4ae46688b96693d2816f55db6f5ffccbe96d8828cdbf29c5
100 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File T1059.001 PowerShell

The RTF document contains OLE objects that are automatically linked and updated, indicating an attempt to exploit OLE activation vulnerabilities. This mechanism is commonly used to download and execute secondary payloads. The heuristics strongly suggest an exploit targeting OLE object handling within the RTF format. No document body or script content was available for further analysis, limiting the ability to identify specific payloads or delivery URLs.

Heuristics 3

  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000f61.bin
d241d48d3972b11057ed2dd8f7a7618dad462221b62ab8c5d0bb91819878f908
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xF61 1480 bytes