RTF malware analysis — malicious · abf4bc14f8e2fc31

MALICIOUS

RTF

43.0 KB

MD5: 00068838e42135dd7bdca7c5b0a94e9f SHA-1: d3e0db92fb4ffb7cfb6e75253ec96cf03c2912cc SHA-256: abf4bc14f8e2fc31204f2347268646183fe340aa88c195342c2319bcd25db2cc

200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object specifically identified as Equation Editor (Equation.3), which is a known vector for exploiting CVE-2017-11882. The presence of \objupdate and RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR heuristics strongly indicates that the file is designed to trigger this vulnerability for arbitrary code execution. The embedded object likely contains a secondary payload.

Heuristics 6

Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED

RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 3 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB

RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE

One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00000019.bin` `d40ae4a33ad8def1b2f7c88fd4a4d4819179a7fb8dc6964d98b85aa7eb4a7a35`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x19	20199 bytes
Detection ClamAV: No threats found Obfuscation or payload: likely Carved artifact contains 1 shell/COM execution token(s).
`objdata_01_off00009e0f.bin` `6ef048de06e9c2e6b420e78a489e52123766b08549a074a5f95b98ffe8558f38`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x9E0F	1709 bytes
`objdata_02_off00009e1f.bin` `8935eb605040753f89379b3f05c2cdaefba833ec64299ed9c258020f4c1217b0`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x9E1F	36 bytes

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