RTF / .DOC malware analysis — malicious · abee8eb200115f6a

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

765.1 KB

MD5: 6cbcf86407611cb7d0ca73eb1cdceb35 SHA-1: d56656a54b4b94af8cc9752080a5ffb83fe75242 SHA-256: abee8eb200115f6a7e5f8f099aa79294f87e4172d28baeeea898c4d6935e07c4

182 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.003 Windows Command Shell

The sample is an RTF document containing an OLE object that exploits the Equation Editor vulnerability (CVE-2017-11882). The heuristic firings strongly indicate the presence and exploitation of this known vulnerability. The embedded OLE object is likely a second-stage payload, though its specific function cannot be determined from the provided static analysis alone. The document body contains only a numeric string, providing no contextual clues.

Heuristics 5

Equation Editor OLE1 native payload — CVE-2017-11882 related critical CVE related CVE_2017_11882_RELATED

RTF decodes to an OLE1 Equation.3 embedded object whose native data is large and payload-like, and \objupdate requests automatic activation. This is the delivery shape used by Equation Editor RCE documents such as CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802, but the malformed MTEF record needed for exact attribution was not recovered.
Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE

One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off000000a9.bin` `27519818c9e96d520aeb991f4bac20272ac01f208209ab8fc1858e736fe111c5`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0xA9	391482 bytes
Detection ClamAV: No threats found Obfuscation or payload: likely Carved artifact entropy is 8.00, consistent with packed or encrypted content.

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