Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 abdad56eb6a3c7a3…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

4.3 KB
MD5: 9f60434f6e949c6d0926172caa9911b4 SHA-1: e53e223d12c36e699ca535029c2ba5b56240e5ba SHA-256: abdad56eb6a3c7a3cf87f77ae1ce36cd44a7fd0f983c8d46635dbc0956cf15a9
160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1559.001 Component Object Model

The RTF document contains embedded OLE objects, specifically triggering heuristics related to Equation Editor exploitation. The presence of `RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR` and `RTF_OBJUPDATE` strongly indicates an attempt to leverage a known vulnerability in the Equation Editor component to achieve arbitrary code execution upon opening the document.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000000b0.bin
526bad1daa2655ee471208244b3b416a0713750edaab5cc08dec8610924914ff
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xB0 1921 bytes