Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 abc3a7112691803c…

MALICIOUS

RTF

30.0 KB First seen: 2023-07-04
MD5: 9f3bad3d47d50457a413733647c70844 SHA-1: e8666c3434c6ef492fb91d128ff62933beda3610 SHA-256: abc3a7112691803c3ab673aa1d92baad9ce55b869fb20d210dd21f783786b71e
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious Link T1059.005 Service Execution

The RTF file contains an embedded OLE object with a split Equation Editor ProgID, and an \objupdate directive that forces OLE activation. The document body includes a lure instructing the user to 'Enable editing' to view the document, which is a common technique for malware droppers to bypass macro security settings. The presence of these elements strongly suggests an exploit attempt targeting OLE object handling.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00004375.bin
f6d578bf90d7f94374b55131b255ad0d8879c33f0605eea1d1151282d59fa0b7
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x4375 1430 bytes