Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 abb2f7b0c7ffe696…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

683.5 KB Created: 2019-09-17 13:59:00
MD5: 4356586937d42344925211114a0303f4 SHA-1: 15c7972b3faa79c024d18bc34eaa194d3f0bcd42 SHA-256: abb2f7b0c7ffe696a3ca6ee787c1ffa22b7044fe52b3536aa60c15ee0865291d
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The sample is an RTF document that contains embedded OLE objects, specifically triggering heuristics related to Equation Editor and OLE activation. Critical heuristics indicate exploitation of CVE-2017-8759, a known vulnerability in MSXML that allows for OLE object activation. This suggests the document is designed to exploit this vulnerability to execute arbitrary code upon opening.

Heuristics 6

  • CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759
    RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
  • Equation Editor CLSID critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Equation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000a3e72.bin
260ec5a88c433e873933f45833ea92bd0aab729c6b26c213e5cf9b3d4235b239
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xA3E72 3739 bytes