Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 ab98ae87a4c978c9…

MALICIOUS

PDF

70.1 KB Created: 2020-11-06 04:59:52 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-02-23
MD5: 16f388147b929828c388a7b8e4f9056f SHA-1: 15e76d0e1ae7d7f5540f003355d35ba1a2985282 SHA-256: ab98ae87a4c978c9d848b2c3d0e256c28dd5e1e8db71d0ebc0562d7b0944b3a2
192 Risk Score

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 6

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Fake invoice / payment lure low SE_INVOICE_LURE
    Document contains invoice or payment language paired with an action verb — useful context when combined with link, macro, or attachment indicators
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://traffking.ru/123?keyword=aloha+manager+report+guide In PDF document text
    • https://xisudujerixaxir.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134583325/femirewuripijalifole.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://dutitujazekap.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130814390/zujobis-bogutuxufat-zepajawo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wazajodowefode.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/0/134017502/826e2f.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://tajurasexir.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131606020/rovepu_danod_muburukupe.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zupuxugemewizo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134309945/9f88df6b2d7204.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xetutinafo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130775845/635929.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://viwuwobigoku.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131378942/8386043.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://bavejojonosepes.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131380601/jejezutesuvi-tulevipisa-wukotomudali-dufadenel.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://rulomegujenuguv.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134329868/vomenagizibow-vujawanonusoj-tujosebunexuf-genezagimonu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/137bf575-1b9d-4470-9873-8568d2210c34/kefoj.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/d9efe141-78b9-47e4-911d-de53ca1889f5/40730961852.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/ec7d04e4-8772-4ef1-a48c-252726fb57d5/zotif.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/livivuvuwugeb/dokibaparijalozafogefe.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/688c8f9f-0363-4a36-b68e-b80a5a3aadfd/rimopil.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/783b2158-5bbb-4d7e-be89-7ffc09386433/48082874466.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/mubemutolewe/loganeb.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000d48d.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xD48D 5184 bytes
SHA-256: 495b9339211bcf1a5bb449ae14a1ca1929316ad2a3efefe3e31ddc0110380d5f
font_01_sfnt_off0000e5fd.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE5FD 10996 bytes
SHA-256: 70ff8e6ac7b357ac9a0d81edaa84a15edc400c4a4a1138091cbe468f3cc6b503

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