Office (OLE) malware analysis — malicious · ab97cc7eeb09fcd0

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

909.0 KB Created: 2021-07-12 19:54:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word

MD5: 90f6edec8143a64b6751812aa075ea0f SHA-1: a4a0d8ef8d31bcaf08c65de2a402eec03d47985b SHA-256: ab97cc7eeb09fcd04bf4f694620169dd1132c713cb12d380c62745f605581d30

502 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.005 Visual Basic

The sample is a malicious Microsoft Word document that leverages CVE-2007-3899, a memory corruption vulnerability, to execute arbitrary code. The Document_Open macro attempts to download and execute a DLL file named 'ier.dll' from a path constructed using ShellExecuteA. This DLL is likely a second-stage payload, and the macro's execution of ShellExecuteA with the constructed path indicates a clear intent to load and run malicious code.

Heuristics 14

CVE-2007-3899 — Microsoft Word malformed string memory corruption critical CVE likely CVE_2007_3899

Word OLE document has the MS07-060 malformed-string exploit shape: a Word 97-family FIB points to a malformed DOP/string-table region with an abnormal INT_MAX run, inflated text counters, and exploit payload or Mdropper.Z campaign evidence.
Office EPRINT stream contains EMF object high CVE related OLE_EPRINT_EMF_OBJECT

OLE ObjectPool contains an EPRINT stream with EMF data. This is rare in normal documents and is CVE-2007-3893/MS07-046-family evidence when paired with Office exploit payload anomalies, but the malformed EMF record is not proven by this rule alone.
OLE with Ole10Native — possible CVE-2026-21514 exploitation high CVE likely CVE_2026_21514

Document contains a Word OLE object with Ole10Native plus executable, PE, or risky remote-link indicators. CVE-2026-21514 exploits OLE metadata validation; this stronger structure is treated as likely exploitation.
Embedded PE executable critical OLE_EMBEDDED_EXE

MZ/PE header found inside document — possible embedded executable
Reference to ShellExecute API high SC_STR_SHELLEXEC

Reference to ShellExecute API
Reference to LoadLibrary API high SC_STR_LOADLIBRARY

Reference to LoadLibrary API
Reference to GetProcAddress API high SC_STR_GETPROCADDRESS

Reference to GetProcAddress API
Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN

Document_Open macro
Ole10Native package carries executable/script file type high OFFICE_PACKAGE_RISKY_FILE

OLE Package displayName or fullPath ends in an executable or script-capable extension. Even without UI extension spoofing, embedding a runnable payload inside an Office document is a high-risk delivery pattern.
VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC

Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
Reference to VirtualAlloc API medium SC_STR_VIRTUALALLOC

Reference to VirtualAlloc API
Reference to VirtualProtect API medium SC_STR_VIRTUALPROTECT

Reference to VirtualProtect API
VBA macros detected medium OLE_VBA_MACROS

Document contains VBA macro code
Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL

One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.

URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`macros.bas` `b5a7e566e787ae76b3491725e523f8881ec6221b06afd3c7f170be285b5d8f9b`	vba-macro	oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source)	3198 bytes
`embedded_office_0008ec6e.exe` `83f20f930698d1ce11347e235851b6655a9ffa8b871b2e8747a661bafb44520e`	embedded-pe	Office MZ+PE at offset 0x8EC6E	346002 bytes
`ole10native_00.bin` `272bf5bc4481ed979a40a056cb9674a323c70fa91d5f11294d08a1f3c2d5e0cd`	ole-package	OLE Ole10Native stream: ObjectPool/_1687657213/Ole10Native	315692 bytes

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