Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 ab83eac20d7d856e…

MALICIOUS

PDF

70.6 KB Created: 2021-02-12 19:54:39 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-05-15
MD5: 10f3c9325ad6d4c282071f327c2f9e49 SHA-1: 2d3b9f6f45799db4b752be3ed5ac0b827c72a933 SHA-256: ab83eac20d7d856e97cbc8440500645242fcfb0e637810d6ff2e016ce7725926
194 Risk Score

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Image lure linking to an SEO redirector (free-download phishing) high PDF_SEO_UTM_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF embeds an image with little or no body text and a clickable link to a multi-word utm_term / FeedBurner-proxied SEO redirector — the 'free ebook / solution-manual / document download' phishing family that ranks for natural-language search queries and routes the user into a payload/redirect chain. The PDF carries no exploit; the risk is the linked destination. Flagged structurally (image lure + SEO redirector) so it does not depend on a ClamAV/ML signature, and regardless of how many filler text pages the lure carries.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://crophysi.ru/wix?keyword=shopping+cart+hero+3+unblocked+weebly In PDF document text
    • https://betetudiju.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135348010/2224711.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://antileqphh.site/refraction_of_light_download_class_11g59y9.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kusipujetaz.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134462876/3670984.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://dibevoxatatot.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/1/131164568/tobogosodarix_polariw_moxamadun_sifosizuzuwa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://sellforce.ru/17236479296mwckb.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://somirurawepaf.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131381963/peparujajosijexev.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://bafexobis.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/0/134041027/tunefu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://gitapelo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132682700/9966777.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://importants.space/bovurimisototojivikigeo0u5l.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://amin-ukraine.net/best_online_photo_editor_professionalud7jc.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://munejubulogulep.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/2/134266186/1cbc0de29a24.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/jonora/xapozi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/wewuxuviwar/audio_converter_windows_xp_free.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/zuses/presentation_skills_ppt.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/bezorito/former_atlanta_public_schools_superintendent.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/tobaziw/76850717772.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/jimugivos/kofadazerag.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/belopudevuzuza/super_bomberman_3_super_nintendo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/dazemi/15362450179.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/sojuravewi/zozebuda.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000d6ac.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xD6AC 5820 bytes
SHA-256: a143d4d9813c3f1ac4a4d4fd4838bf9745b1bba5924f8c3bd84061e7244265e1
font_01_sfnt_off0000ea89.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xEA89 10052 bytes
SHA-256: fced04da672488f1fc55072dc00dbce5176b4eb3f2250ebac88af3106886e315

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