Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 ab62490963345f0a…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

67.6 KB Created: 1996-12-17 01:32:42 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel
MD5: 362d2011c222ae17f801e3c79e099ca7 SHA-1: 1a6883de488f904fd70fbf01c2e07fdda9e90ab1 SHA-256: ab62490963345f0aebd3e09aebe238384ed7c3a4aebea3fced2f66dc8bf895eb
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious Link T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter

The critical CVE-2009-3129 heuristic indicates the sample exploits a specific Excel vulnerability. High-severity heuristics for PEB access and suspicious cmd.exe invocation suggest post-exploitation activity. The embedded URLs, while not definitively malicious, point towards a potential delivery or command-and-control channel. No scripts were extracted from this sample.

Heuristics 5

  • CVE-2009-3129 — Excel FEATHEADER record overflow critical CVE exact CVE_2009_3129
    Workbook BIFF stream contains a FEATHEADER (Feature Header) record with anomalous size (record_size=22, isf=4, cbHdrData=4). Legitimate FEATHEADER records are tiny (<100 bytes) and carry cbHdrData values that fit in the record body; the value here is the documented CVE-2009-3129 exploit primitive — cbHdrData drives a memcpy with attacker-controlled size, leading to memory corruption and code execution in Excel 2007/2003.
  • PEB access via FS segment (x86) high SC_PEB_ACCESS
    PEB access via FS segment (x86)
  • Suspicious cmd.exe invocation with execution flag high SC_STR_CMD
    Suspicious cmd.exe invocation with execution flag
  • OLE document has large unaccounted-for region high OLE_SLACK_ANOMALY
    OLE file is 69,182 bytes but its declared streams total only 24,565 bytes — 44,617 bytes (64%) live in unallocated sector slack. This is the canonical hiding place for pre-macro-era Office exploit payloads (XOR-encoded shellcode reached via a parser pointer-corruption bug in the document structure).
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.pdf-repair.com
    • http://www.pdf-repair.com)/Producer(Advanced
    • http://www.pdf-repair.com)/ModDate(D:20100406171120+08
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/

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