Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOCM — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 ab4d7740ac5322ec…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOCM

21.5 KB Created: 2021-03-04 08:07:00 UTC Authoring application: 16.0000 First seen: 2023-03-17
MD5: 30e9080923e6188573c1167c60e79f73 SHA-1: 4fd2149c32c044ef407dedef73494ade2b62f716 SHA-256: ab4d7740ac5322ec82f286477da1b147413b93218fa230d6f7692418314c002e
210 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1071.001 Web Protocols T1059.001 PowerShell T1033 System Owner/User Discovery T1016 System Network Configuration Discovery

The sample is a DOCM file containing a VBA macro with an AutoOpen subroutine. The macro attempts to lure the user into enabling content by displaying a "protected document" message. Upon enabling, it collects system information including username, hostname, IP address, and MAC address, and sends this data to the hardcoded URL http://10.10.21.157/api/data_post. This indicates a reconnaissance and data exfiltration stage.

Heuristics 8

  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • GetObject call high OLE_VBA_GETOBJ
    GetObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings
  • Environ() call (env variable access) low OLE_VBA_ENVIRON
    Environ() call (env variable access)
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://10.10.21.157/api/data_post
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartex
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
85cf03975c84ef2c35c4b30e544099be92d14a699e51c1e44515aaffc96d5fa8		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 1923 bytes
vbaProject_00.bin
6d51950ef1668550658881f5516e4041485529d98936c9fb8aea2c5e69d57a06		 vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 20480 bytes

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