Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 ab205c8369ac5b6f…

MALICIOUS

PDF

78.5 KB Created: 2021-07-24 23:42:17 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3)
MD5: dad5bb434b5b2a48ae0784f1f2420476 SHA-1: ebc7d528a43dc65a9aa8f786b5e2a6126eb1e7bb SHA-256: ab205c8369ac5b6f7ac86070a280bfb613cc816efb905796e58c5d3cb6504d28
136 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The PDF document contains multiple embedded URLs, some of which point to compromised CMS upload storage, indicating a link farm designed to host malicious files. The 'SE_BROWSER_INSTALL_LURE' heuristic strongly suggests the document's purpose is to trick users into installing malicious browser extensions or updates. While no scripts were directly extracted, the overall structure and heuristics point to a social engineering attack aiming to deliver a payload.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9995

Heuristics 6

  • Browser extension / update installation lure high SE_BROWSER_INSTALL_LURE
    Document tells the user to install a browser extension, plugin, viewer, or browser update to view content — a common social-engineering path for credential theft and malware installation
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://sonarmusic.hu/up_image/file/medaxujojasogalidibisonok.pdf
    • http://wsm.hk/images/uploadfiles/file/nanoperutopomoz.pdf
    • http://www.pranabkumar.com/fckimages/file/lexuremisewodubepuvow.pdf
    • https://miamiuniquelimo.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a926d3a3f02---93725558662.pdf
    • http://nhs1980alumni.com/clients/878257/File/76647914976.pdf
    • http://aranykoronakft.hu/userfiles/file/bananezaj.pdf
    • http://www.unidacardoso.com.br/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a714ed3004d---1365339938.pdf
    • https://bonacorsi.it/file/90472900233.pdf
    • http://www.kliningstroy.ru/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a0d727640d5---41348424696.pdf
    • http://szentistvanpatika.hu/upload/file/tegizifobojokavifobufubix.pdf
    • http://ampletrekking.com/userfiles/file/55232008327.pdf
    • http://businesslegalgroup.com/customer/3/d/9/3d947ad6ce2568d98b832ccf5548371bFile/6317078596.pdf
    • http://www.advokat.com/app/webroot/img/fck/file/90262238080.pdf
    • https://414movement.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/b6536375c69eaf9a0ef40880e9e0a579/20905345935.pdf
    • https://hps-gruppe.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/c4ojkepea855nccsuq7kmi04vm/10162744967.pdf
    • https://123natura.com/stockages/files/zebagorejo.pdf
    • https://archltginc.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/7e9f6a6656bac32691b0242dafbe8811/603050993.pdf
    • http://onlineexpert.in/userfiles/file/24505573242.pdf
    • http://www.naturapreserved.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1606c8071917a0---xutarebav.pdf
    • http://universalestetic.com/userfiles/file/81946873555.pdf
    • http://bettaletroom.com/file_media/file_image/file/mazokozaniduga.pdf
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/Uplcv/~3/3CAf4wW3hvY/uplcv?utm_term=how+to+make+cable+tray+offsets
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/License

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000ced4.bin
e782120ea9e3440996b8a44996e4e6d54004a84812018b7c4c9703a622ff7974
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xCED4 10724 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000e797.bin
9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE797 16792 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off0000ffa9.bin
5aa7f1271049a3d11877fdf6310a9ba6f306da1de23cf383abe47b65f658445d
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xFFA9 16944 bytes